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 Sharing Accounting’s Burden: 
 Business Lawyers in Enron’s Dark Shadows   
Lawrence A. Cunningham* 
“To paraphrase Clemenceau on war and generals, accounting has become just too 
important to be left to the accountants.”1   That comment was made in 1975 by Jim Freund, 
renowned M&A lawyer at Skadden, Arps in his classic book Anatomy of a Merger.  He 
justified the threatened invasion by lawyers of the accounting and auditing professions, in part, 
because newly-adopted rules on business combinations effectively inserted accounting 
treatment into merger negotiations.2  While repeal of the old pooling/purchase rules is being 
                                                                 
*  Professor of Law and Business, Boston College.  © 2002 Lawrence A. Cunningham. 
All rights reserved.  Thanks to my colleagues Scott FitzGibbon and Judith McMorrow; 
to my editor Ira Breskin; my research assistant Justin Belair; my assistant Anne Marie 
Dolan; and my editor at West Group,  Staci Herr, for help researching the publishing 
history of accounting books for law school use. 
1   James C. Freund, Anatomy of a Merger (1975), 94. 
2  These rules distinguished between pooling and purchase accounting according to a 12-
point list of structural and transactional requirements to achieve pooling.  Accounting Principles 
Board Op. Nos. 16, 17 (1970).  Most managers doing deals prefer pooling.  M&A lawyers worth 
their salt knew the list by heart and knew how to negotiate using it.  See Ted J. Fiflis, Accounting 
for Mergers, Acquisitions and Investments, in a Nutshell: The Interrelationships of, and Criteria for, 
Purchase or Pooling, the Equity Method, and Parent-Company-Only and Consolidated Statements, 37 
Bus. Law. 89 (1981); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Introductory Accounting and Finance for 
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phased in as of mid-2002, numerous accounting concepts so directly affect the structuring of 
deals, their disclosure, the form and amount of consideration, and other aspects of 
negotiations and compliance, that the Clemenceau quip has become more apt in the nearly 30 
years since Freund wrote it.3  
Sharing accounting’s burden isn’t one of the leading lessons to learn from the Enron 
debacle and the problems it epitomizes.4  Instead, dozens of other lessons are drawn by a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Lawyers (2d ed. 1999), ch. 12. 
3  Ted Fiflis used the quip as well, without the nod to Clemenceau, in his call for enhanced 
teaching of accounting in law schools.  Ted J. Fiflis, Thoughts Evoked by “Accounting and the 
New Corporate Law,” 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 959, 970 (1993). 
4    Enron was a large energy, commodities and services company, marketing electricity and natural gas, and 
providing financial and risk management services around the world. It became clear in late 2001 that it had 
failed during the preceding four years to make proper disclosure concerning various “related party 
transactions” and properly to account for “off-balance sheet” transactions that ended up costing billions.   
These terms refer to a series of deals Enron made with several partnerships it created in which both Enron 
and top Enron executives held interests.  The relationships were not disclosed and Enron’s interest in the 
partnerships were so substantial that they should have been treated as consolidated entities on its books, 
rather than as minority investments.   
The initial consequences were staggering, and only worsened.  Twenty percent of Enron’s 
shareholders’ equity was wiped out–a total of $2.2 billion.  The company restated its financials for the 
preceding four years, producing a 20% reduction to reported cumulative net income of nearly $600 million 
($96 million in 1997, $113 million in 1998, $250 million in 1999 and $132 million in 2000).  On the balance 




wide variety of critics, regulators, and legislators, who offer a stunning range of incompatible 
prescriptions.  Enron’s cacophonous commentators share the trait of the proverbial man with a 
hammer, to whom every problem looks like a nail.  Advocates of stricter auditing standards 
see a system-wide breakdown in audit quality,5 devotees of corporate social responsibility cite 
Enron to support their cause.  Those on the left use it to bolster their case that more regulation 
is needed, while those on the right point to insufficient market competition as the cause of the 
failure.6   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
These disclosures were the beginning of the end, starting with a failed merger/bailout 
with Enron’s crosstown rival Dynergy, then Enron’s bankruptcy, then the collapse of its outside 
auditor, Arthur Andersen.  Throughout the process, media coverage was intense, mudslinging 
fierce, Congressional hearings televised, and such mischief as document shredding, and 
managerial sales of stock during its downward spiral capturing the attention of the least 
business-minded American citizens.  Hurt in the process were hundreds of thousands of 
people, most especially Enron shareholders and employees.  
5  Critics had a point about auditing deficiencies.  The point was made the more ironic by the 
client flight from Enron’s outside auditor, Arthur Andersen, as it was collapsing as a result of a 
Justice Department indictment which stemmed from investigations into its audit practices, 
particularly its shredding of Enron records.  Its clients fled, of course, mainly to the other four 
big firms, operating pretty much in the same sort of culture.  All firms had and have something 
to fear from what auditors call “scary” clients. 
6  Compare Editorial, Cleaning Up the Boardroom, The New York Times (March 8, 2002) 
(criticizing Bush proposal to improve corporate governance in Enron’s wake as halting and 
insufficient) with Editorial, Investigating Enron, The Wall Street Journal, November 30, 2001 
(arguing that if Enron had faced less in the way of regulation, the scandal would have been 
averted).  Stephen Labaton & Adam Clymer, Party Lines Begin to Emerge as Congress 
 
 5 
A charitable view of this phenomenon–seeing what we want to see–is based on the fact 
that it is a natural cognitive bias, perhaps the sensible exercise of competency.  Even so, care 
must be taken not to overemphasize the significance of one’s field or preexisting viewpoint in 
assessing new events.7  Bearing this wisdom in mind, any lawyer remotely interested in 
corporate governance and accounting must be able to appreciate that lawyers play a 
significant role when accounting fraud  occurs and should consider the nature of that role and 
duties attendant to it.  This appreciation shows that an important lesson from Enron is the 
danger that prevailing professional cultures create a crack between law and accounting that 
resolute fraud artists exploit, not cultures that emphasize the intersection of law and accounting 
that should foil would-be fraudsters. 
The first part of this article puts Enron in perspective, suggesting that few of the various 
lessons being drawn by commentators are as sound as the one that lawyers doing Enron-like 
deals better know enough accounting to credibly contribute the value of that knowledge to 
other members of the deal team.   The second part illustrates business lawyers in action, 
emphasizing that the intersection of law and accounting is central to business life and that 
competent business lawyers grasp rudimentary accounting principles.  The next part shows a 
lamentable decline in the resources the legal academy has allocated to accounting pedagogy 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Debates Enron, The New York Times (March 21, 2002). 
7  Cf. Jerome N. Frank, Accounting for Investors, The Fundamental Importance of Corporate 
Earning Power, 68 J. Acct. 295, 300 (1939) (former SEC Commissioner discussing how 
accountants view their role and warning that, “Every man is likely to overemphasize and treat 
as fundamental those aspects of life which are his peculiar daily concern.”). 
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in the past 27 years.  This embarrassment to the profession of legal education is particularly 
acute when you consider, as the section does, that knowing a little accounting is also essential 
to students learning basic corporate law.  The final sections draw the chief normative 
implication, that the professional duty of competence should compel business lawyers to 
obtain a minimum level of accounting knowledge, and that it isn’t difficult to do so. 
 I.  Enron in Perspective 
Before pursuing professional practice and ethics questions concerning business lawyers and 
accounting, let’s put Enron in perspective.  This will shed light not only directly on the law and accounting 
intersection, but also on the position of commentators drawing broader and potentially far-reaching lessons 
from the case.  To put Enron in perspective, consider whether it is a debacle revealing systemic failure of 
seismic proportions–as the shear dollar size, media coverage and political attention suggest–or an 
accounting scandal isolated in its causes and cures (though obviously bearing an enormous fallout). 
Giant scandals of the current era that exhibited systemic infirmities include:  
•for the banking system:  Penn Square, the little Oklahoma bank that by the early 1980s had made 
more than $2.5 billion in dubious loans it spread throughout the banking system that brought on the near-
failure of Continental Illinois, then the 7th largest US bank, rescued only by a $4.5 billion bailout;8   
                                                                 
8  Phillip L. Zweig, Learning Old Lessons From a New Scandal, The New York Times (Feb. 2, 
2002); Phillip L. Zweig, Belly Up: The Collapse of Penn Square Bank. Penn Square made 
loans to borrowers of dubious credit quality during the Texas oil boom, sold those loans to 
other banks, including Continental Illinois, and when the price of oil plummeted in the early 
1980s, the collateral securing these loans fell along with it.  Penn Square’s CEO, Bill 
Patterson, spent two years in jail on banking law violations, and Continental Illinois was saved 
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• for the capital and corporate control markets: the economy-wide leveraged buy-out (LBO) 
boom-to-bust cycle attributed to junk bond financing purveyed by Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham 
Lambert in the 1980s that bankrupted in the 1990s numerous companies with values in the tens of billions of 
dollars;9 
•for the integrity and security of our financial infrastructure: BCCI (the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International), which generated losses of $10.5 billion when it was finally liquidated in January 
1992 after years of deception by a complex and illicit world-wide web held together by rich Arab bankers 
and prominent Washington lawyers;10 and 
• for the savings and loan industry: the industry-wide S&L crisis (scapegoated or epitomized by 
Charles Keating and Lincoln Savings and Loan), with origins in the 1970s that spanned through the late 
1980s and early 1990s, due to poor legislative controls, weak regulatory oversight, shortsighted industry 
credit decisions, and aggressive accounting practices throughout the industry.11 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
only by a $4.5 billion US rescue package–then the largest ever. 
9  E.g., United States v. Milken, 759 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
10  E.g., United States v. BCCI Holdings, 69 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 1999) (opinion, one of 
dozens the judge wrote in the 8-year case, begins “At last!”); First American Corp. v. Sheiky 
Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, 17 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 1998). 
11  E.g., Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp 901 (D.D.C. 1990).  In the case of Lincoln, 
one failure among many were the judgments accountants made to book profits from purchase 
transactions in which their own funds were used to pay the purchase price.  Said the court in 
concluding that the regulatory takeover of that thrift was proper: 
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Each of these monumental corporate failures carried specific causes, rogues, and consequences, 
with identifiable systemic significance–the banking system, the capital markets, the financial infrastructure 
and the S&L industry.   In their wake followed major media coverage; Congressional hearings; and 
administrative, civil and criminal investigations.  Post-scandal reforms usually are hotly debated for a few 
months, then often shelved as the debacle fades into the recesses of public memory, exactly what happened 
after Penn Square12 and the LBO bust.  In the latter case, Drexel’s bankruptcy and Milken’s jail time ended 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
What it is hoped the accounting profession will learn from this case is that an 
accountant must not blindly apply accounting conventions without reviewing the 
transaction to determine whether it makes any economic sense and without first finding 
that the transaction is realistic and has economic substance that would justify the 
booking of the transaction that occurred.  Moreover, they should be particularly 
skeptical of any transaction where the audit trail is woefully lacking and the audited 
entity has failed to comply with the record keeping requirements established by a 
federal regulatory body.  
Accountants must be particularly skeptical where a transaction has little or no 
economic substance. This is so despite the fact that the transaction might technically 
meet GAAP standards. In a paper prepared by Touche Ross & Company in 1975 the 
following poignant statement appears: "The goals of accounting are to measure, record 
and communicate economic reality. In the long run, these goals are necessities–both 
for accounting and for society. Can behavior be economically rational if not grounded 
on economic reality.” 
Id., at 913 (footnote format omitted).    
12 Zweig, supra. 
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the saga, despite flirtations to regulate junk bonds and LBOs out of existence.13  The other common upshot: 
enhancement of supervisory power of regulators, as happened after BCCI,14 or replacing one regulatory 
body with another, as happened after the S&L crisis.15 
Contrast these seismic and systemic breakdowns with numerous significant accounting frauds at 
public companies, which occur regularly.  Memorable accounting horror stories from the 1960s and 1970s 
                                                                 
13 The junk bond market dried up due to its own success–too much leverage and associated high interest 
payments brought on numerous bankruptcies.  One spectacular instance was the bankruptcy of Campeau 
Corp., which loaded up on debt to buy Allied Stores in a fierce bidding war with R. H. Macy & Co.–a deal 
that led observers later to ask how Campeau’s lawyers could have advised it throughout that process.  A 
broader debate of the same type ensued, centered on the degree to which lawyers and clients are 
functionally one.  E.g., Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their 
Clients, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 507 (1994). The regulatory impulse was at first strong–with proposals to 
eliminate the deductability of interest on debt, or eliminate the double taxation of corporations, to enhance 
disclosure of risk, to restrictions on the link between the fairness opinions bankers gave in these deals and 
their fees, to more aggressive plans to limit takeovers and LBOs.  All were shelved.  See generally 
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Lawrence A. Cunningham, and Lewis D. Solomon, Corporate Finance 
and Governance (2d ed. 1997), 1032-1036. 
14   After BCCI, Congress adopted the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act (FBSEA) to bolster 
Federal Reserve regulatory oversight of foreign banks. 
15   The major reform after the S&L crisis was the enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery 
and  Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA").  Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 355.   FIRREA abolished the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") and the Bank Board and replaced them with 
the   Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") and the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"). 
 
 10 
include Leasco, Penn Central, and National Student Marketing.16  By the late 1990s, the 
frequency of corporate accounting scandals had tripled.17   They include household names 
such as Aurora Foods;18 Cendant (CUC International);19 HBOC (McKesson);20 Leslie Fay;21 Rite Aid;22 
                                                                 
16  These scandals and a dozen others were chronicled in classic, popular books written by 
Professor Briloff, the leading crusader for integrity in financial reporting, who called upon every 
profession, including lawyers, to aid the cause.  E.g., Abraham J. Briloff, Unaccountable 
Accounting (1972) and More Debits Than Credits (1976), xiii (noting also U.S. Financial, Lockheed, ITT, 
Kauman & Broad, Stirling Homex, Equity Funding and Robert L. Vesco).  National Student Marketing 
is particularly notable in the context of the obligations of lawyers when it comes to accounting matters.  It 
held liable prominent business lawyers who became aware of financial fraud at the closing of a merger 
through a required comfort letter.  SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 
(D.D.C. 1978).  They allowed the closing to proceed without disclosing the facts to shareholders, whose 
approval was required and had already been given.  Reinterpretations of the story as a parable abound.  
E.g., Arthur R.G. Solmssen, The Comfort Letter, in John T. Noonan, Jr. & Richard W. Painter, 
Professional and Personal Responsibilities of the Lawyer (1997), 123-142; James Freund, Lawyering: A 
Realistic Approach to Legal Practice (1979), 291-299 ("The Uncomfortable Comfort Letter"). 
17  Financial Executives International, Financial Reporting Quality (June 2001), reported in Jonathan Weil, 
“Restatement of Earnings Have Multiplied,” Wall St. J. (June 7, 2001). 
18  United States v. Cummings, 2002 WL 334902 (S.D.N.Y. March 1, 2002); In the Matter of 
Mueller, SEC (Jan. 24, 2001). 
19  In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D.N.J. 2000); In re Hiznay, SEC 
(June 14, 2000). 
20  Ash v. McCall, 2000 WL 1370341 (Del. Ch. 2000); In re McKesson HBOC Sec. Litig., 126 
F. Supp. 2d 1248 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 
 11 
Sunbeam;23 Waste Management;24 Xerox25 and on and on.  They number more than 150 per year.26   
These scandals feature such accounting shenanigans as recognizing revenue prematurely, creating 
fictitious revenue through phony invoices and shipping documents, miscounting customer unit volume, 
inflating inventory, capitalizing expenses and other age-old bookkeeping tricks.  The remedies are usually 
company-specific rather than industry-wide or system-wide–enhanced internal controls, removal of supine 
directors and filling vacancies with attentive ones, changing auditors, and greater scrutiny from watchdogs 
ranging from rating agencies and research analysts to the SEC.27 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
21  In re Leslie Fay Cos., 207 B.R. 764 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
22  Rite Aid Corporation v. Grass, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4669 (E.D. Pa. April 17, 2001). 
23  In re Sunbeam, SEC (May 15, 2001). 
24  In re Waste Management, Inc., SEC (June 21, 2000). 
25  Floyd Norris and Claudia H. Deutsch, Xerox to Restate Results and Pay Big Fine, The New 
York Times (April 2, 2002). 
26  Some of these tales are catalogued in my book, Introductory Accounting and Finance for 
Lawyers (3d ed. 2002), ch. 15.  To date less than 1% of public companies are forced to 
restate financials, though the US attorney and the SEC appear poised to pursue more cases.  
Colleen DeBaise, Manhattan U.S. Attorney’s Office Chief Of Securities Fraud Expects Rise in 
Cases, The New York Times, March 13, 2002; Susan Pulliam, SEC Broadens Accounting-
Practices Inquiry, Wall. St. J. (April 3, 2002). 
27  Some accounting aggressions appear to arise in particular industries and can be said to 
plague them, such as decisions relating to revenue recognition for software companies or the 
use of pro forma data by cash-driven businesses, but these plagues tend to migrate to other 
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Which is Enron more like?  At the core of the Enron debacle are accounting chicanery related to 
off-balance sheet financing, related party transactions and colossal failures of board oversight.28  In its 
penumbra are auditing conflicts of interest that may be pervasive, incentivized board members posing as 
independent directors who could be more widespread than is known, law firms apparently asleep at the 
deal, and political donations and influence-peddling that is almost certainly more common than polite 
politicians prefer to pretend. 
Even if Enron is considered more of an accounting scandal than an indictment of corporate America, 
a more jarring characterization is appropriate.  In its accounting aspects, Enron is both an isolated example 
of accounting fraud and the epitome of systemic failure in the financial reporting and disclosure regime.  It is 
another accounting scandal added to the sum of accounting scandals that evidences a broader dysfunction.  
It is still not of the same class as a failure of the banking system, the capital markets, financial infrastructure 
or the S&L industry.  Enron as an accounting scandal is akin to the straw that broke the camel’s back, not a 
bull in a china shop. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
industries in fairly short order (as with both these examples).  See infra Part V. 
28    Enron, Form 8-K (Nov. 2001); Enron Press Release (Nov. 2001); William C. Powers, Jr.; 
Raymond S. Troub; & Herbert S. Winokur, Jr., Report of Investigation by the Special 
Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. (Feb. 1, 2002) (Counsel: 
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering) (the “Powers Report”).  The Powers Report details the actions of 
the Enron board in reviewing and approving various partnerships improperly accounted for.  
Though the report presents the action in somewhat sanitized and exculpatory fashion, it is hard 




The accounting camel’s back has been broken before, in a similar way.  The early 1970s were 
riddled with accounting horror stories.29  The sense of systemic dysfunction at the time spawned a U.S. 
Senate Committee on Government Operations study entitled “The Accounting Establishment,”  an 
examination that led to enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.30  Before Enron, the current series 
of accounting debacles led the SEC, under Chairman Arthur Levitt in the late 1990s, to enact a broad array 
of new rules, principally designed to enhance the independence of auditors.31  The Levitt reforms took effect 
in 2000, after most of the fraud at Enron had already been perpetrated.32 
                                                                 
29  E.g., Briloff, supra. 
30  See Accountancy and Society: A Covenant Desecrated (testimony of Abraham J. Briloff 
before the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (March 
2002) (noting also the creation of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA and the inauguration 
of peer review procedures as responses to the widening scandals).  The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, which is by no means limited to foreign corrupt practices but rather addresses 
domestic accounting controls, is discussed further in Part IV. 
31    Securities and Exchange Commission, Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence 
Requirements, 17 CFR Parts 210 and 240 (2000). 
32   Arthur Andersen’s position as the one Big Five firm that suffered its own meltdown from 
client accounting scandals may be a partial function of the cyclicality o f auditor discipline that 
proceeds from rebuke, reform to relapse.  The other Big Five members faced rebuke during 
the latter 1990s while Andersen’s wrists had not been slapped during that period of 
exuberance that made accounting scandals more likely to occur.  See G. Peter Wilson, Don’t 
Throw Out the Reporting Baby with the Enron Bath Water: Crucial Considerations When 
Reforming the Reporting System (manuscript March 2002) (copy on file with the author). 
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In terms of symptoms and scale, the nearest recent corporate calamity to Enron may be neither the 
seismic debacles nor the isolated accounting incidents but instead the case of Long Term Capital 
Management Co. (LTCM).  This highly-leveraged hedge fund placed losing bets on a billion dollars worth 
of global financial instruments.  Their mounting losses in late 1998 threatened to crater the world’s financial 
system until a rescue brokered by the Federal Reserve averted that fate.33   
While LTCM was isolated, the crisis followed on the heals of a series of smaller but still 
substantial debacles in the global derivatives market place, including at Barings;34 Gibson 
Greetings;35 Orange County, California;36 and Metallgesellschaft AG.  The cases exposed 
systemic weaknesses and led to broad-gauged solutions.  Reforms included enhanced 
transparency through disclosure, superior management controls, greater board oversight and 
more accurate accounting.37  
Similar sets of reforms are likely in the light of Enron.  But in the case of financial 
                                                                 
33  See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Outsmarting the Smart Money (2002), ch.3; Roger 
Lowenstein, When Genius Failed (2000). 
34  See “The Collapse of Barings,” The Economist (March 4, 1995). 
35  See In re BT Sec. Corp., 58 SEC Docket 1145 (1994). 
36  See Orange County Ch. 9 Bankruptcy (Case No. SA 94-22272-JR), N.Y.L.J. (March 16, 
1995) 
37  E.g., The President’s Working Group Report (May 1999); Derivatives Policy Group Report: 
Framework for Voluntary Compliance, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 86,607 (March 9, 1995); 
FASB Statement No. 133. 
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derivative instruments, these then-nonexistent regulations seemed an apt response.  In the 
case of Enron, it is hard to see what new regulations are possible.  After all, regulate what?  
Accountants? Auditors?  Executives?  Boards?  Politicians?  Regulations are all in place.38  
There are also criminal laws relating to accounting, auditing, and disclosure that landed in jail 
top executives at companies rocked by recent accounting scandals, along with hefty civil 
penalties for associated professionals.39   
Those with a deep desire to regulate in the wake of Enron found a stalking horse in the 
                                                                 
38  There is obviously room for vigorous debate concerning the contours of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and the durability of Central Bank v. First Interstate 
Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994), but these debates operate within a philosophy of accountability. 
 They are not about foundational issues, but rather concern tilts in the power balance as shifted 
by tools such as pleading rules, burdens of proof, and selecting lead counsel. 
39  Holman W. Jenkins Jr., The New Business Casual: Pin Stripes, Wall St. J. (March 13, 
2002); Big Six Have Paid $1.7 Billion Since 1991 in Securities Fraud Cases, Study Finds, 27 Sec. Reg. & 
L. Rep. (BNA) 1723 (1995) (includes liability to private plaintiffs and to regulators); David R. Herwitz 
and Matthew J. Barrett, Accounting for Lawyers (3d ed. 2001), 248-249 (12% of audit industry 
revenues are absorbed defending and settling lawsuits and regulatory claims); Richard W. Painter and 
Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. 
Rev. 225, 227 (1996) (from 1989 to1994 the largest six accounting firms paid nearly $400 million to settle 
private class actions, and all firms as a whole paid nearly $500 million).  Among notable examples are the 
bankruptcy in 1990 of Laventhol & Horwarth (then the 7th largest accounting firm) and payments to 
regulators in 1992 by Ernst & Young of $400 million, and in 1994 by Deloitte & Touche of $312 million 
and by KMPG Peat Marwick of $186.5 million.  Herwitz and Barrett, supra. 
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prominent rating agencies–such as Standard & Poor’s,40 Moody’s, and Fitch–hauling them 
before Congress with threats to regulate their activities.41  Murmurs are heard to federalize 
corporate governance, to federalize the regulation of auditors, to hold CEOs personally liable 
for financial statements, eliminate directorial indemnification for fraud claims, and similar 
large-scale change.42  Others lay blame on such abstractions as shareholder wealth 
maximization norms, and argue that the norms should be jettisoned.43 
History offers no reason to expect that new rules will prevent a repeat of accounting 
                                                                 
40  In the interest of full disclosure, Standard & Poor’s is a division of McGraw Hill, publisher of 
some of my books. 
41  E.g., Richard A. Oppel Jr., Credit Raters Face Inquiry Over Enron, The New York Times 
(March 20, 2002) .  Included was the SEC, which simultaneously cautioned against regulations 
restricting auditors from the consulting business.  Michael Schroeder, SEC Weighs Curbs on 
Credit-Rating Firms, Wall St. J. (March 21, 2002). This position is arguably parochial, and the 
rating agencies a scapegoat, given that the new SEC Chairman Pitt has close ties to the 
auditing industry and his predecessor Chairman Levitt made prohibiting auditors from 
consulting a top priority.  The responses, across the board, reflect the perceived need among 
politicians and regulators to do something, to satisfy the public, and to demonstrate control.  
The only unregulated participant in the drama, the rating agencies, are an obvious, perhaps 
inevitable target of this behavioral impulse. 
42  E.g., The New York Times (Feb. 2002) (describing Treasury Secretary O’Neil’s proposal to 
prohibit insurance of CEOs for financial misstatements). 




scandals even of this large size or frequency.44   On the contrary, even scandals of systemic 
dimensions, such as Penn Square, yield no fresh new regulatory strategies for frustrating the 
resolutely fraudulent or criminal.  In the case of financial derivatives, LTCM occurred a couple 
of years after numerous regulations were adopted following the series of earlier crises.   Thus 
there is a real risk of the potential for over-regulation in the post-Enron era.45   At the broadest 
level, post-Enron policy discussion revived the old federalism debate in corporate law,46 one 
                                                                 
44  See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Endless Quest for Integrity in Financial Reporting, PLI 30th 
Annual Institute on Securities Regulation (November 1998).  Though perhaps lamentable, this is 
neither defeatist nor nihilist, but reality.   For parallel examples of reality, see, for example, 
these stories appearing on the same day in  The New York Times: Eric Lipton and James 
Glanz, U.S. Report on Trade Center Fire Echoes Lessons of Past Disasters (April 2, 2002) 
(the engineering reality that no reasonable precautions could have prevented the World Trade 
Center complex from collapsing after being hit with commercial jet airplanes) and Nicholas D. 
Kristof, The Boomerang Syndrome, The New York Times (April 2, 2002) (quoting the Israeli 
newspaper Haaretz as opining that the Israeli military operation “will not end the confrontation 
[with Palestinians] and will not destroy terrorism”).  The same can be said for the Bush-
declared U.S. “war on terrorism.”  But no politician can stomach such realities, or gain 
reelection agreeing with them, but must devise answers to prevent the most recent realized 
threat. 
45  The risk was so substantial that Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan offered his 
sobering advice against indulging this risk.  Greg Ip, “Greenspan Warns Against Too Much 
Regulation,” Wall. St. J. (March 27, 2002). 
46  Compare William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 
Yale L. J. (1974) with Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory 
of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977); Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 
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that seemed resolved.  Its revival confirms the risk of over-reaction.47 
There is no question that Enron is an accounting scandal and no doubt that accounting 
scandals have been on the rise.  Whether reforms of accounting and auditing are overdue or 
other responses warranted, there is one other thing that is certain: business lawyers are 
present during most accounting frauds.  That presence, coupled with a credible dose of 
accounting sense, will often enable a lawyer to discourage accounting fraud–and perhaps 
even, on rare occasions, prevent it.  While lawyers face delicate issues of ethics relating to the 
preservation of client confidences in such settings, lawyers may not simply stand on the 
sidelines and allow accounting frauds to go forward.48 
In Enron’s case, lawyers played a central role in the formation, structuring, and reporting 
of various partnerships treated as off-balance sheet to Enron.  But under applicable 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
(D.C. Cir. 1990). 
47   Part of that risk is the very fact that auditing and corporate law are regulated at local levels (particularly 
state and industry), and the threat of federal or other supervisory intervention is a powerful check against 
excess.  Naturally checks do not always work, any more than the exercise of that threat would work.  But 
that threat can be more powerful than its invocation.  The shrewd among those stirring up the rhetorical 
threats are very likely aware of this effect. 
48   Lawyers well recall the notorious case of the U.S. Office of Thrift Supervision cracking 
down with a $275 million enforcement action against venerable business law firm Kaye 
Scholer for its role in advising Lincoln Savings & Loan, a failed thrift.  See Lester Brickman, 
Has the Office of Thrift Supervision Changed the Relevant Ethics Rules by its Actions in the 
Kaye, Scholer Matter, in The Attorney-Client Relationship After Kaye, Scholer 79 (PLI 
Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 779, 1992). 
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accounting rules, these special purpose entities were required to be shown on Enron’s 
consolidated balance sheet (and therefore also subject to disclosure under federal securities 
laws).  Questions concerning who knew what when remain unanswered, but with Enron in this 
perspective, prudence suggests that before regulating by adding new layers and monitors, 
active professionals should be required to beef up their accounting skills. 
 II. The Practice of Business Lawyers 
The incentive for lawyers to become part-time accountants is by no means limited to 
helping clients steer clear of accounting irregularities or fraud, though that adds value.49  It is an 
asset at the bargaining table and should be used as such.50   Freund gives a good example 
                                                                 
49  E.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Preventive Corporate Lawyering: Averting Accounting Scandals, 
Cardozo Life (Spring 1997). 
50  The emphasis on the importance of accounting to the business lawyer should not disguise 
the broader significance of accounting to lawyers.  Accounting is pervasive in law, and life, and 
must be familiar to lawyers in a wide variety of practice areas: litigators calculating damages 
and structuring settlements; tax lawyers in virtually every professional setting; environmental 
lawyers handling cost allocations; labor lawyers dealing with profit sharing agreements; 
domestic relations lawyers addressing asset settlements and maintenance and alimony 
arrangements; regulatory lawyers involved with antitrust, health care, insurance, and public 
utilities; and so on.  See Herwitz and Barrett, Accounting for Lawyers, supra, v-vi; Stephen A. 
Zeff, Review: Accounting for Business Lawyers, 46 Tulane L. Rev. 358, 362 (1971) 
(“Accounting is important to all lawyers, not to business lawyers alone.”); e.g., Nardini v. 
Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184 (Minn. 1987).   
Failure of lawyers to understand accounting can produce disastrous results.  For 
example, a statute settling disputes among Alaska natives specified a resource sharing 
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(though one that is now moot because pooling is being repealed).51  Buyer and Seller have a 
tentative agreement to merge if pooling accounting treatment can be obtained.  Seller is 85% 
owned by holders who favor the deal and 15% by those likely to oppose it.   On corporate and 
tax levels, there is no problem: 85% is a sufficient majority for shareholder approval and a 15% 
dissent would not jeopardize tax-free treatment.52   
Pooling accounting treatment was only available, however,  if at least 90% of Seller’s 
shares are being acquired in the deal.  So when Seller and the 85% group consult the 15% 
holder, care must be taken not to alert him to how important pooling is.  Likewise, if you 
represent the 15% holder whose approval is sought, you suspect pooling is important and 
advise your client it has a very strong hand to play (e.g., as to registration rights and limiting 
your client’s liability on Buyer’s representations and warranties).53  Scores of like illustrations 
of the importance of accounting knowledge to the M&A lawyer can be spun drawing on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
arrangement that pooled and reallocated resources based on “revenues” of each cooperative 
rather than based on “income”–as no doubt was intended.  But failure to appreciate the 
difference led the legislation to continue rather than settle the dispute.   Fiflis, Teaching 
Accounting, supra, at n.44 (citing the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1601 
(1971)). 
51   Freund, supra, at 102-104. 
52  See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) through (C). 
53  See infra. 
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dozen requirements for pooling.54 
Freund gives another by modifying the example to suppose that Buyer was, until 
recently, an 85%-owned subsidiary of another company.  A point under negotiation is whether 
to pay in cash (Seller’s preference) or stock (Buyer’s preference).  Buyer’s lawyer argues that 
using cash means no pooling, which means post-closing earnings will be lower, so argues to 
lower the purchase price.  May sound good to a novice.  But the lawyer, also a part-time 
accountant, will observe that Buyer’s having been a sub within the past two years of another 
company disqualifies pooling treatment on its own—so this Seller’s lawyer can easily defeat 
the argument of Buyer’s lawyer to lower the price for a cash deal.55 
But pooling is dead, so consider a deal to sell a corporate division.56   A threshold legal 
issue is whether the division sale constitutes the sale of all or substantially all the assets of the 
corporation requiring a shareholder vote.57 The standard approach to analyzing whether a 
transaction triggers statutes requiring shareholder votes for the sale of “all or substantially all” a 
                                                                 
54  Cunningham, Introductory Accounting (2d ed.), supra, at 231-234. 
55  Accounting Principles Board, Op. No. 16. 
56  The pooling examples remain particularly illuminating, however, for they rose in significance 
from 1975 to 2000, the precise time period when the teaching of accounting in law schools 
declined in significance.  See infra section III. 




corporation’s assets considers quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the transaction.58 
  
Different judges have applied a bewildering array of metrics for the quantitative 
assessment.  These range from the book, market or transaction value of the assets to the 
revenue, gross or net income, or cash flows generated by the assets.59  Each of these 
concepts is a term of art.  They can mean different things, within a range, so long as it is 
reasonable.  Knowing this, as well as the boundaries, is essential for a lawyer to reach an 
informed opinion concerning whether shareholder approval is required–or at least and more 
likely to advise a client of the probability that a judge would decide on a preliminary injunction 
or summary judgment motion that it was.60 
                                                                 
58  E.g., In re Avard, 5 Misc.2d 817, 144 N.Y.S.2d 204 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955) (construing 
predecessor to current New York statute); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n  v. Angeion Corp., 615 
N.W.2d 425 (Minn. App. 2000) (applying New York law), review denied, 2000 Minn. LEXIS 
691 (Minn. 2000); Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff’d per 
curiam, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974) (construing Delaware statute); Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 
445 (Del. 1989) (holding that sale of securities amounting to 80% of assets did not trigger 
Delaware statute because entity’s business consisted of buying and selling securities). 
59  E.g., In re General Motors Class H Shareholders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, at n.10 (Del. Ch. 
1999) (cataloguing six separate Delaware cases and noting complexity of the analysis that 
reflects “a policy preference for doing equity in specific cases over the value of providing clear 
guidelines for transactional lawyers structuring transactions for the corporations they advise”). 
60  Tax knowledge that hinges on accounting concepts is also implicated in an asset 
acquisition for stock. A stock-for-assets acquisition qualifies as a tax-free reorganization 
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The question of whether a division sale constitutes all or substantially all a corporation’s 
assets can call for refining the numbers even further, a refinement that also calls for close 
cooperation between lawyers and accountants in designing suitable representations and 
warranties.  Major questions arise due to the difficulty of deriving reliable historical or projected 
operating results at the division level.   The two broadest questions are the feasibility of the 
buyer’s accounting post-closing and the sense of its purchase price.   
Divisions are typically run as integrated operations within a corporation.  Intra-company 
transactions may not be recorded in accordance with GAAP.  They may be invisible.   Funds 
flowing from headquarters to the division may have been assigned a cost (an interest rate) but 
how that was determined (not using market rates) and how the division is going to be charged 
when it is freestanding or part of the buyer are different matters.  Moreover, headquarters 
would have provided a range of back office services, such as legal, accounting, and insurance, 
whose costs will not burden the division’s books either.   
Lawyers obviously are not the prime professionals to assess these matters.  But they 
must understand them to assure that a due diligence team staffed with accountants gains 
access to required information and draft agreements reflecting adjustments required by these 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
under Section 368(a)(1)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code where at least 90% of the seller’s net 
assets and 70% of its gross assets are included.  Rev. Proc. 77-37, § 3.01.  Assumption of 
liabilities does not disqualify tax-free treatment, though the seller must liquidate and distribute 
the stock to its shareholders.  IRC 368(a)(2)(G).  
  An equally stunning range of qualitative characteristics has been emphasized or muted 
by various judges, running from whether a sale would radically transform or materially alter the 
purpose of the corporation to whether the assets sold are the sole or primary ones owned. 
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accounting realities.  These representations are intended, in part, to elicit information from the 
seller about variances and ultimately to provide adjustments to the purchase price or 
representations that everyone is happy with (the seller can stand by and the buyer can look to if 
things go awry). Examples of such representations include: 
That all services rendered to the division have been recorded in its accounts at full and 
fair value; that interest has been charged on all funds furnished to the division at 
competitive market rates; that all goods sold to or from the division have been 
accounted for as if they were transferred in arm’s length transactions; that the division’s 
income has not been overstated because land it leases from headquarters carries rent 
 below that obtainable in an arm’s length transaction.61 
In many cases, making some or all these representations will not be easy or possible 
for the seller.  Likewise, it may be difficult for a division seller to prepare audited or certified 
financial statements.  In that case, it will be necessary for the seller to furnish pro forma 
financial statements.  This involves starting with the existing financial records and then making 
adjustments for intra-company transactions otherwise unrecorded.  Seller’s management must 
then estimate these figures—the value of legal services for example and the market cost of 
borrowed funds.  The buyer’s auditor must examine the assumptions and estimates.  A lawyer 
unaware of the flexibility and judgment involved will be less well-prepared to assess whether 
the process has proceeded satisfactorily or whether additional contractual protections are 
required. 
                                                                 
61   Freund, at 457. 
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Suppose a buyer and seller agree in principle to an asset sale, but disagree on the 
value to be assigned to some intellectual property yet to be market tested.  The seller places a 
high value on the assets while the buyer is more pessimistic.  One solution (apart from leaving 
the assets out of the deal)62 is an earn-out provision under which the purchase price payable is 
contingent on actual performance and paid over time.63  The lawyer most capable of 
negotiating and agreeing on the terms and specifics of an earn-out provision is one who 
understands accounting.   
Apart from specifying legal standards to impose on the buyer that are relatively easy to 
negotiate and draft (even if difficult to define, such as managing the business as a prudent 
person would or using best efforts), 64 specification of how the accounting will be done is 
essential.  Sellers will have no control after the deal closes over such matters, and so will 
prefer an agreement drafted with an orientation toward the top line (sales), to minimize the role 
the buyer’s judgment can play in the process.  Buyers, in control, will prefer a focus at or near 
                                                                 
62  E.g., Dale A. Oesterle, The Law of Mergers and Acquisitions (1999), 160-162. 
63  A classic classroom favorite from contract law using an earnout is  Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing 
Corp., 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979); see Victor Goldberg, Great Contracts Cases: In Search of 
Best Efforts–Reinterpreting Bloor v. Falstaff, 44 St. Louis L.J. 1465 (2000).  Goldberg points 
out that earnouts are not routinely used in acquisitions, though they are used regularly enough 
and when used pose difficult issues of drafting and interpretation.  Id.  (of  9,000+ deals in 
1998, only 153 used earnouts, though many of these ended up in dispute, usually arbitration). 
64  E.g., Richmond v. Peters, 22 Bank & Corp. Gov. L. Rep. 404 (6th Cir. 1999) (excerpted in 
Dale A. Oesterle, The Law of Mergers and Acquisitions (1999), 303). 
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the bottom line, enabling them to exercise judgment concerning a variety of matters over which 
GAAP gives discretion.   
The accounting-savvy seller’s lawyer will take care in the agreement to constrain buyer 
discretion over the top line.  This calls for providing rules concerning when revenue is 
recognized.  This lawyer may also seek to restrict the buyer’s discretion over the bottom line.  
Ways to do so include specifying what expenses are associated with the intellectual property 
in question; how  fixed charges associated with it will be depreciated; and how reinvestment in 
the kindred technology will be treated (expensed or capitalized, for example). 
A lawyer asked to give an opinion concerning whether a company has the legal power 
to pay a distribution to its shareholders must know some accounting.65  Such distributions are 
often made in connection with transactions involving a substantial role for business lawyers, 
ranging from spin-offs and split-ups to joint ventures and other cooperative enterprises.66 
Rules in most states forbid shareholder distributions that would render assets less than 
liabilities or produce equity insolvency (the inability to pay debts as they come due).67  No one 
                                                                 
65  E.g., Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941) (Douglas, J.). 
66  Shareholder distribution rules are a particularly good example of the overlap of the accounting and legal 
professions, for the topic is tested on the licensing exams of both professions. See Craig A. Peterson and 
Norman W. Hawker, Does Corporate Law Matter? Legal Capital Restrictions on Stock Distributions, 31 
Akron L. Rev. 175 (1997).  In an earlier era, this was seen as the essential  overlap in law and 
accounting.  E.g., William P. Hackney, Accounting Principles in Corporation Law, 30 L. & 
Contemp. Probs. 791 (1965). 
67  E.g., Model Business Corporation Act, § 6.40. 
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can form a judgment about these matters without knowing basic accounting.  Likewise, without 
such knowledge no one can assess whether certain adjustments to the accounts are lawful for 
the purpose of enabling the making of the distribution.68 
Loan agreements contain private arrangements to afford creditor protection like that 
offered by statutes restricting distributions to shareholders.  They invariably are tighter than the 
statutes and are defined expressly in terms of financial ratios that depend on accounting 
information.  A typical covenant requires a lender to maintain a minimum level of working 
capital, defined in turn as current assets less current liabilities (themselves further defined).   
                                                                 
68  E.g., Randall v. Bailey, 23 N.Y.S.2d 173 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff’d, 288 N.Y. 280 (1942) 
(classic case approving board’s creating surplus from which dividends could be lawfully paid 
by revaluing real property assets on the balance sheet, along with the equity, a strategy not 
possible to imagine, understand, or assess, without knowing a little accounting); see also 




Remedies for breach of these financial covenants may include acceleration of the 
principal amount of the loan.  Some agreements contain cross-default provisions under which 
the agreement is deemed breached upon the breach of another agreement. Lawyers 
negotiating and drafting these documents obviously must be competent to create legal 
definitions using accounting concepts, and sufficiently understand the variety of these 
definitions to ensure harmonization of triggers in various agreements.69 
Beyond knowledge of basic definitions, a business lawyer’s familiarity with a few 
technical accounting rules is important.  For example, if the remedy on default is acceleration 
of the principal, accounting rules require that the entire principal amount be treated as a 
current liability.  That treatment can trigger defaults under other agreements that contain ratio 
tests requiring minimum working capital levels. 
.   Accounting rules also provide, however, that a lender’s waiver of default for at least one 
year from a balance sheet date enables the borrower to treat the defaulted obligation as a 
long-term liability.  If so reducing the borrower’s working capital would trigger a default on 
                                                                 
69   Indentures and credit agreements contain dozens of defined accounting terms used to specify the 
respective rights and duties of the borrower and lender.   A typical indenture includes, for example, the 
following accounting terms: “Capital Lease Obligation,” “EBIT,” “EBITDA,” “Fixed Charge Coverage 
Ratio,” “Funded Debt,” “Indebtedness,” “Intangible Assets,” “Interest Expense,” “Net Income,” “Net 
Tangible Assets,” “Net Worth,” “Pre-Tax Cash Flow,” “Tangible Net Worth,” and “Working Capital.”  
Some of these may be modified by the word “Consolidated,” and this term defined.  E.g., 
Model Simplified Indenture, 38 Bus. Law. 741 (1983).  Case law takes these definitions seriously.  
See Michael, supra (excerpting a series of cases, including Powell v. Burke, 423 A.2d 97 
(Conn. 1979)).   
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senior debt, it may be in the lender’s best interest to waive the breach rather than accelerate.  
A lawyer who is also a part-time accountant can explain this to the lender and its other lawyers 
in a way that many cannot–sometimes preventing a financial cascade in no one’s interest.70  
Many terms in loan agreements incorporate by reference the definition of generally accepted accounting 
principles.  It is common for such loan agreements to include as a "rule of construction" a provision such as, 
"Unless the context requires otherwise, an accounting term not otherwise defined has the meaning assigned 
to it in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in effect from time to time."71   
Innocuous, fair and even-handed as an appeal to “generally accepted” principles 
sounds, this is not always in a client’s bests interest and only an accounting-savvy lawyer will 
know or understand why.  GAAP is a set of conventions, rooted in historical cost accounting 
and conservative in its philosophy, that tends to understate the fair value of vast asset classes, 
including particularly intellectual property.  A shareholder buyout agreement of a high-tech 
company with enormous intellectual property rights using unadorned GAAP to set the price 
would be disastrous for the selling shareholder. 
The framework of the Federal securities laws relating to the disclosure of forward 
looking information is teeming with the law and accounting overlap.  The Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 defines various categories of forward looking information,  two 
                                                                 
70  K-Mart faced just such a situation in 1996.  See K-Mart Gains Reprieve in Final Accord, But 
Retailer to Post Loss for Quarter, Wall. St. J. (March 4, 1996); K-Mart Corp., Report on Form 
8-K (filed Jan. 19, 1996). 
71  Model Simplified Indenture, supra.   
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of which pose substantial mixed questions of law and accounting (fact): predictions that must 
be disclosed if created and those that may voluntarily be disclosed.  The cautious advice is to 
resist creating projections in these two categories, advice that must conform with legal 
standards and accounting principles.   
Suppose two firms plan to merge.  Rules require a joint proxy statement governing 
shareholder approval of the deal to include pro forma financial statements showing how the 
combined entity’s financials would look if they had been combined previously.  That suggests 
what is called for is historical information and to that extent there is no major problem (though 
the activity is by no means simple addition, but calls for harmonizing the accounting used by 
the combining firms that may have differed when they stood alone). 
More critical is whether the resulting picture presents a reasonably accurate one or 
whether it is deficient or misleading in some way that requires adjustment.   SEC regulations 
say that when this occurs the pro forma presentation must “give effect to the range of possible 
results.”72  While lawyers may read this to require detailed presentation and footnote analysis 
of the range, the standard response of accountants is not to disclose such details but offer a 
broad and strict disclaimer emphasizing that pro forma presentation is a “mechanical 
exercise” bearing no relation to actual results or any measurement or aggregation of synergy 
or other gains to be generated from the combination.  No lawyer can advise in this process 
without knowing what these sorts of terms are intended to convey, why accountants are 
concerned about them, or how to negotiate with the SEC if that becomes necessary to 
                                                                 
72  SEC Reg. § 210.11-02(b)(8). 
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convince it to approve proxy materials prepared this way.73 
Similar conversations between lawyers and auditors arise concerning loss 
contingencies resulting from litigation risks.  These are disclosed as a line item on the balance sheet 
with  cross-references to footnotes.  Lawyers and auditors must confer to prepare the appropriate 
disclosure.  That discussion is more productive when each side understands that the other has different 
professional objectives and duties.  The concern of lawyers is confidentiality, while that of auditors is 
disclosure; lawyers are advocates for their clients, while auditors are watchdogs for the public.74  But 
understanding different professional roles is hardly enough. 
The law and accounting professions use different vocabulary to discuss the subject of loss 
contingencies.  Auditing rules provide that losses that are remote need not be disclosed at all, those that are 
possible call for such descriptive disclosure, and those that are probable (and can be estimated in amount) 
must be recorded on the books in those amounts.  The two professions define these terms remote, possible, 
and probable differently.  Lawyers negotiating with auditors over which risks and amounts must be 
disclosed or kept confidential will be far more successful armed with an understanding of these differences 
and will be able to find a middle ground that meets the professional duties of both sides. 
A lawyer advising a client facing a shareholder proposal may benefit by knowing 
accounting.  Grounds on which management may properly exclude such a proposal include 
                                                                 
73  See also Oesterle, supra (“any investor reading the pro forma for information must have a 
very sophisticated knowledge of accounting principles to make sense of the numbers and 
qualifications”).  
74  United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984). 
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where the subject matter relates to de minimus operations.  The SEC measures the threshold 
in accounting terms, as less than 5 percent of the company's total assets, net earnings and 
gross sales.75   Terms of accounting art again.  While accountants will have to crunch the 
numbers to test the thresholds, it will be up to lawyers to argue the case, using accounting 
vocabulary. 
One regulatory reform that is possible in Enron’s light, particularly with the concomitant 
fall of its outside auditor Arthur Andersen, is to turn accounting principles into law.  The US and 
UK are unusual because they allow accounting rules to be set by the accounting profession.  In 
Continental Europe, accounting rules are codified by legislators as a matter of law.  If this 
practice were adopted in the wake of Enron/Andersen, no longer would there be any question 
of a lawyer’s duty to master the subject. They would be law, de jure.  For some purposes in the 
US, accounting is law, as where accounting rules promulgated by the private sector are 
sanctioned and functionally adopted by the SEC.  These appear in the vast accounting 
provisions of the federal securities laws and regulations, ranging from the numerical data 
required in the management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A) sections to the more detailed 
specifications of Regulation S-X.76    
                                                                 
75  Rule 14a-8 (5) (in addition, for management to exclude it, the proposal must not otherwise 
be significantly related to the company's business). 
76  See William J. Grant, Jr., Regulation S-X: A Primer for the Practitioner, in Kenneth J. Bialkin & William 
J. Grant, Jr., Securities Underwriting: A Practitioner's Guide (1985), 343.  
While most securities lawyers are familiar with the disclosure requirements of Regulation S-K 
adopted by the SEC pursuant to the 1933 Act, many practitioners who engage in securities matters 
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But suppose Congress legislated that the origination and review authority for 
accounting principles was vested entirely in the  SEC or other federal agency–a commonplace 
proposal in the late 1960s and early 1970s amid that era’s escalating level of accounting 
scandals.77   All other pronouncements–of the FASB, the AICPA, and state accountancy 
bodies–would be demoted to the status of secondary authority, much as with the ABA, state 
bar associations, and law review commentary.  A lawyer’s practical needs would be 
unchanged from the current state of affairs.  Competent business lawyers know this and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
are unfamiliar with the SEC's financial statement disclosure requirements contained in Regulation 
S-X.  In the context of a public offering of securities, such attorneys usually rely on the issuer's 
accountants to ensure compliance with the SEC financial disclosure requirements.  Although some 
reliance is generally appropriate, the varying degrees of expertise in SEC matters among accounting 
firms and the fact that issues of financial disclosure often involve mixed questions of law and 
accounting make it incumbent upon an attorney who represents either an issuer or an underwriter, at 
a minimum, to understand the fundamental financial disclosure requirements of Regulation S-X. 
77  E.g., Homer Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 NYU 
L. Rev. 1151, 1176-78 (accountants should play the leading but non-exclusive role in 
propounding accounting principles but establishing them as binding should be the province of 
an administrative agency such as the SEC for the “skills necessary are not only those of the 
accountant, but those of the lawyer, the economic statistician, the economist and the financial 
analyst”); Abraham J. Briloff, Accounting Practices and the Merger Movement, 45 Notre Dame 
L. Rev. 604, 623-24 (1970) (proposing the creation of a specially constituted consortium 
charged with enacting applicable accounting rules); Arthur Andersen & Co., Establishing 
Accounting Principles–A Crisis in Decision Making 23 (1965) (proposing establishing an 
accounting court to take setting accounting rules out of the hands of practitioners). 
 
 34 
therefore treat accounting principles as an important tool in their professional toolbox, even if 
by virtue of the manner and source of their present promulgation they are better understood as 
facts rather than law. 
 III. The Training of Business Lawyers 
Law students are often surprised to learn that stock options need not burden an income 
statement.  They often think that they obviously would.  But accounting is not so obvious, and a 
little such understanding will go a long way.  Reactions like these make a business lawyer and 
law professor interested in accounting wonder what role law schools play. 
A decade ago, one study lamented the state of accounting teaching in law schools, 
echoed by a leading law professor in an article urging law schools to do more.78  A few years 
later, another article on how accounting is and can be taught in law school–presented at a 
major conference by an author of a corporations casebook that incorporates accounting–
suggests little improvement in the environment.79   
Harder evidence confirms the sense that the state of accounting teaching in law schools 
has been deteriorating.  The number of full-time law teachers indicating that they teach 
accounting has fallen steadily since the mid-1970s, the peak of accounting pedagogy in law 
schools.  At its high-point in 1975, 150 full-time law professors identified themselves as teachers of 
                                                                 
78  Fiflis, supra, at 968-970. 
79  Elliott J. Weiss, Teaching Accounting and Valuation in the Basic Corporation Law Course, 
19 Cardozo L. Rev. 679 (1997).  
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accounting.80  In 2001, 96 did so, a drop of 36% during a period when the number of law schools 
increased by 19% and the number of full-time law professors increased by 35%.81   The portion of that 
group indicating that they were teaching accounting during the year surveyed likewise has suffered a steady 
decline since the mid-1970s, dropping a full 50% in that period.82  
                                                                 
80  American Association of Law Schools, The AALS Directory of Law Teachers (1975) (the 
“1975 Directory”).. 
81 American Association of Law Schools, The AALS Directory of Law Teachers (2001-02) (the 
“2001 Directory”).  See Appendix A.  As a point of comparison at the other extreme, the 2001 
Directory lists as teachers of constitutional law 109 persons in New York City alone (135 for 
the metropolitan New York area) and 61 in the Boston area.  The 1975 Directory listed 51 
constitutional law teachers in New York City (75 for the metropolitan New York area) and 41 in 
the Boston area.  Since 1975, therefore, the number of constitutional law teachers increased 
by 113% in New York City, 80% in metropolitan New York, and 49% in the Boston area (while, 
as the text indicates, the total national number of legal accounting professors fell by 36%).  
82   Id.  These data are not conclusive, of course, for the subject could be increasingly taught by 
adjuncts or others not listed in the AALS directory.  It is doubtful the entire shift can be 
explained on these grounds.  Even the portion it does explain is not exactly good news for 
those who believe accounting should be considered an important course for lawyers.  The 
allocation of full-time faculty dedicated to a subject indicates institutional commitment, while 
delegation of the course to others does not.  To the extent the teaching is done by accounting 
scholars, moreover, this could do more harm than good.  E.g., Weiss, supra (teaching 
accounting to lawyers in the way accounting professors teach it in business schools is the 
worst thing that could be done). 
An additional indicator is the number of schools boasting a full-time law professor 
teaching accounting. The 1975 Directory identifies 111 schools as having at least one full-time 
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So beginning when leading business lawyers such as Jim Freund were emphasizing 
how important accounting is to their practice, the academy began to demote its significance in 
the law school curriculum.83  Reasons for the decline include the rising intellectual influence of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
faculty member covering accounting, while the 2001 Directory identifies 83 schools (note that 
the number of schools has increased during this period by 19%).  The 1975 Directory 
identifies 8 schools as having 3 or more such faculty; the 2001 Directory identifies 2 (NYU and 
Cardozo, both at 3). 
83  Other 1970s era expressions of the centrality of accounting to a broad range of public 
policy matters include Abe Briloff’s books of 1972 and 1976, see supra, and Congressional 
adoption of legislation mandating the maintenance of accounting books and records and 
compliance controls, see infra (discussing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).  The spirit of 
the times is amplified in the following poignant commentary from a 1971 review of Fiflis and 
Kripke, Accounting for Business Lawyers, by Tulane University accounting professor Stephen 
Zeff: 
While the accounting mission may have been transparent in a simpler day, it is today 
as complex and changing as modern society itself.  If at one time, it was pardonable for 
legal practitioners to ignore accounting altogether, today it is not. 
Zeff, supra, at 358.  Briloff entitled a final chapter of his 1976 book More Debits Than Credits 
“We Are In Pari Delicto,” criticizing the roles played by all parties in accounting scandals, 
including especially law firms involved directly with National Student Marketing (White & Case) 
and Robert Vesco (Wilkie, Farr & Gallagher).  More Debits Than Credits, at 363-370 (noting 
that in these fiascos the “deals could not have been created” without lawyer involvement and 
documentation, which does not “come forth parthenogenetically” and  that lawyers drafting 
these documents “must have recognized” what they were doing). 
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modern finance theory in business and law schools.84  This theory’s efficient capital market 
hypothesis discounts the relevance of accounting data in a world where financial analysts 
pierce the form of accounting reports to discover fundamental values wholly apart from 
accounting choices.  Accounting books published after 1975 often include defensive-sounding 
statements about the role of accounting in a world of efficient markets.85 
At the same time that accounting was declining in significance, the course in Corporate 
Finance gained popularity.86  That course is seen to offer a greater opportunity for including 
discussion of contemporary debates in corporate law conducted by corporate law professors 
yet using the vocabulary and tools of financial economics.87  The community of law professors 
                                                                 
84  Lawrence A. Cunningham & Warren E. Buffett, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for 
Corporate America (1st rev. ed. 2001), 25. 
85  E.g., Stanley Siegel and David A. Siegel, Accounting and Financial Disclosure (1983), 
10-11, state that "Recent economic theory, in particular the ‘efficient market hypothesis,’ has occasionally 
lent itself to the suggestion that the financial statements of enterprises may no longer be relevant to 
investment decisions."  Following this announcement are a series of replies, that financial statements remain 
important for (1) taxation, labor union negotiations, and internal corporate capital allocation; (2) businesses 
whose securities do not trade in organized markets; and (3) promoting market efficiency. 
86  The 2001 Directly lists nearly 400 faculty covering corporate finance, up from 300 
compared to 1975.  That represents a 33% increase since 1975 and a level of coverage in 
2001 more than four times greater than the coverage of accounting. 
87  See William W. Bratton, Book Review: Corporate Finance in the Law School Curriculum 
(reviewing Robert W. Hamilton, Corporation Finance; Cases and Materials),1985 Duke L.J. 
237 (1985).   
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did not pursue original research in accounting to the same degree or on the same scale.88  
The subject and teaching of finance is seen as offering theoretical and empirical heft, while 
that of accounting is seen, wrongly, as insufficiently theoretical and excessively practical.89  
The decline in teaching resources allocated to accounting is matched by changes in the 
nature and number of accounting materials prepared for use in law school classrooms.  When 
accounting was first taught in law schools in the late 1940s, leading scholars from the country’s 
most prestigious law schools raced to publish prodigious casebooks on the subject, starting 
with a group of professors from Harvard, and followed in rapid succession by scholars from 
each of Yale, Cornell, and Columbia.90  These works and revised editions, averaging 525 
                                                                 
88  The trends are now beginning to reverse, with doubt cast over the ECMH and a return to an 
understanding of the importance of accounting data.  E.g., Claire A. Hill, Why Financial 
Appearances Might Matter: An Explanation for "Dirty Pooling" and Some other Types of Financial 
Cosmetics, 22 Del. J. Corp. L. 141 (1997).  The ingrained thinking is stickier among journalists, 
and therefore likely to take the public longer to catch on.  A leading columnist for The Wall 
Street Journal argues, for example, that it doesn’t matter whether one accounts for stock 
options or not, for the market will figure out their significance without regard to accounting.  
Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Much Ado About Stock Options, Wall St. J. (April 3, 2002): 
  “In the real world [sic], any information, as long as it’s deemed relevant, will be 
processed into the mill for pricing securities.  It doesn’t matter whether the data is 
computed into the income statement or appears in a footnote or is shouted up and 
down Wall Street by a man in a tutu.” 
89 See Fiflis, supra. 
90  See Appendix B.   Bragging rights for this leadership are enduringly exercised.  E.g., Herwitz & 
Barrett, supra, at vi (“This book’s roots date back to [Harvard] Professor Robert Amory, Jr.’s pioneering 
 
 39 
pages in length, were succeeded by like-sized and impressive accounting casebooks 
prepared by the next generation of law professors in the 1970s.91 
The next phase of books on accounting for lawyers was decidedly minimalist, however. 
  A leading textbook published in 1983 managed a slim 259 pages,92 with the next year 
featuring a “nutshell” series on the subject, and since 1983 numerous other books of such 
brevity have appeared, including one at a record low 138 pages.93   While shorter content on 
its own does not mean the quality of the material is down, it does suggest that either student 
interest or institutional capacity is.  Since 1980, only one new accounting casebook has been 
published (595 pages)94 and though the old Harvard book was updated in full-length (1094 
pages) even this pedigreed tome had to be trimmed and published simultaneously in a 
“concise” edition (670 pages).95 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
casebook on accounting for law students in 1948.”); Jack B. Weinstein, A Tribute to Dean William C. 
Warren, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1315, 1317 n. 5 (1992) (Warren’s 1950 “casebook on accounting inaugurated 
the teaching of accounting at Columbia and elsewhere in the nation."). 
91  Ted Fiflis et al. (1971) (687 pp.); and James D. Cox (copyright date of 1980, written and 
published in the late 1970s) (807 pp.).  Also David Herwitz, a younger member of the earlier 
Harvard group, published a new version of that team’s work in 1980. 
92  Siegel & Siegel, supra. 
93  Cunningham (270; 299 pp.); Mundstock (350 pp.); Ames (138 pp.).  See Appendix B. 
94  Michael, supra. 
95  Accounting gets a little treatment in the books for cognate courses.  For the basic 
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The reduced commitment of legal academic resources to accounting pedagogy comes 
at an inopportune time when you consider the rising importance of corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility during the same period of the 1980s and 1990s.96  As 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
corporations course, the emphasis is on little.  About a half dozen pages per 1000 is being 
dedicated to the topic.  E.g., Lewis D. Solomon et al., Corporations: Law and Policy (4th ed. 
2000) (Ch. 8, “An Introduction to Financial Accounting and Valuation,” Sec. A: “Financial 
Accounting Demystified” (16 pp. / 1358 pp); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporations and Other 
Business Associations (8th ed. 2000), 17 (ch. 1, sec. 4, “An Introduction to Financial 
Statements) (5 pp. / 960); David G. Epstein, Richard D. Freer, Michael J. Roberts, Business 
Structures (2000), 14-26 (12 pp. / 813 pp.) (trot through the basic financial statements).  
For advanced courses such as corporate finance, the treatment gains a modicum of 
heft.  E.g., Dale A. Oesterle, The Law of Mergers and Acquisitions (2002) (Ch. 7, “Accounting 
and Tax Issues in M&A,” Sec. A “Accounting for M&A”) (24 pp./ 689 pp); John D. Ayer, Guide 
to Finance for Lawyers (2001) (Ch. 12, “The Least Accounting You Can Get Away With”); 
Victor Brudney & William W. Bratton, Corporate Finance (4th ed. 1993), App. A. (36 pp. / xxxx 
pp.); Robert W. Hamilton & Richard Booth, Corporation Finance (3d ed. 2001) (ch. 1, 
“Accounting and Valuation”) (59 pp. / 929 pp.); William J. Carney, Cases and Materials on 
Mergers and Acquisitions (2000) (xxx / xxxx pp.). 
For securities regulation, the treatment is on accounting and auditor certifications and 
liability.  E.g., Larry D. Soderquist and Theresa A. Gabaldon, Securities Regulation (4th ed. 
1999) (registration process and letters from auditors); David L. Ratner and Thomas Lee 
Hazen, Securities Regulation (5th ed. 1996) (auditor liability); Richard W. Jennings, Harold 
Marsh Jr. and John C. Coffee Jr., Securities Regulation (7th ed. 1992) (notably the oldest 
among these securities regulation books and the one with the most accounting-related 
content, though still devoted to the strictly legal rather than the law and accounting context). 
96   Forces driving this rise included hostile corporate raiders in the 1980s and the 
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Washington University School of Law Dean Joel Seligman argues, accounting is not merely the language of 
business, but the language of corporate governance.97  Key concepts in corporate law such as the duty of 
care and business judgment rule should be viewed not in the simplistic terms of arid statements (reasonable 
prudence and presumption of its exercise) but how they shape what directors do and how constraints in 
addition to state law–particularly accounting rules, auditing standards, and SEC enforcement–thus define 
corporate governance. 
A robust literature by contemporary accounting scholars investigates the relationship 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
predominance of the institutional investor in the 1990s.  Highlights of this rise included the 
establishment of  corporate governance programs at various schools.  Columbia Law School's 
Center for Law and Economic Studies was founded in 1975, with a major project on corporate governance 
undertaken shortly thereafter.  Cardozo Law School founded its Samuel and Ronnie Heyman Center on 
Corporate Governance in 1985, kicked off with a major symposium on the subject.  Since the early 1990s, 
ALI-ABA has been hosting an annual conference on corporate governance. 
In the past several years, numerous programs in corporate governance have sprouted, including the 
1997 founding of NYU’s Center for Law and Business and the establishment in 2000 of the George 
Washington University Law School’s Institute for International Corporate Governance and Accountability; 
the University of Delaware's Center for Corporate Governance; and Tuck's Center for Corporate 
Governance.  In 2002, Stanford inaugurated an LL.M. degree in  
Corporate Governance.  [Yale founded an International Institute for Corporate Governance in 19[xx].  Also 
Kennesaw State University’s Corporate Governance Center]. 




between accounting information and corporate governance.98  Accounting data influence the 
mechanisms for dealing with corporate law’s central problem, the separation of ownership 
from control.99  Accounting information influences governance in every direction, including 
board conduct, shareholder rights, executive compensation, takeovers, proxy contests, debt 
contracts, and the audit function–every subject on the syllabus of a basic law school class on 
corporations.100 
Consider one of corporate law’s central doctrines, the duty of care, taught by such 
classic cases as Bates v. Dresser.101 A bank’s bookkeeper opened and used a personal 
account at the bank to write checks that would be charged to other customer’s accounts.  The 
accounting consequence was the bank faced greater liabilities to the bookkeeper and 
correspondingly lower liabilities to its other customers.  He eventually was caught, of course, 
but a few simple internal controls the bank’s board or management easily could have designed 
would have prevented the scheme (such as having the bank’s cashier rather than its 
bookkeeper make the requisite entries or, Eureka, having an auditor double check them).102  
                                                                 
98  E.g., Robert M. Bushman & Abbie J. Smith, Financial Accounting Information and 
Corporate Governance (April 2001) (working paper reviewing and proposing additional 
research). 
99  Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & Econ. (1983). 
100  Bushman & Smith, supra, at 2. 
101  251 U.S. 524 (1920) (Holmes). 
102  At the time, these controls were beyond the needs of common experience, however, so no 
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Another early case now a staple of the corporations course is Graham v. Allis 
Chalmers.103  The engine of Graham was a price-fixing scheme by employees in  the 
company’s power equipment division, an old-line operation that was capital intensive, highly 
competitive and selling standardized products. Shareholders sought to hold the board 
accountable for its failure to detect and deter the scheme, which cost the corporation millions.  
The board having been given no reason to suspect such foul play, the court rejected the 
shareholders’ claim.  The fact that this position is extreme is something only someone with a 
bit of accounting sense would know, given the commodity character of that business.104 
With internal controls now functionally required by federal securities laws,105 Bates and 
Graham are both dated,106 but the cases remain instructive on the scope of the duty of care 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
duty of care violation was found (today there is little question one would be, as the ensuing 
discussion explains). 
103  188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
104  Weiss, Teaching Accounting and Valuation, supra, at 693-695. 
105  E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(b)(2).  This is the wrongly-named Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b).  These laws are part 
of the Securities Exchange Act, § 13(b)(2)(A), and give the SEC general authority to adopt 
implementing rules and regulations, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1 et seq., and cover all SEC 
registrants and all their activities (not, as the act’s title may wrongly suggest, those relating to 
foreign corrupt practices). 
106   See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).  The Enron 
debacle put the question of sufficient internal controls squarely on the table, though the 
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and the power of corporate law’s companion central doctrine, the business judgment rule.  
They remain instructive as a practical matter as well, because they help to shape required and 
optimally-designed internal controls.   The precise contours of the requisite controls vary by 
business, company size, and other factors including, most critically, the nature and extent of 
accounting complexities.    
In fact, one internal control requirement set down by federal securities laws is to have 
controls that enable registrants to prepare financial statements in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles.107   This requirement means that to specify the content of the 
most basic obligation in all of corporate law–the duty of care–one must have some accounting 
sense.108   The consequences for a corporation and its directors for failing to master this are 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Power’s Committee Report suggested the internal controls were up to legal standards.  See 
Power’s Committee Report, supra.  Others drew the lesson that this meant the legal standards 
governing internal controls–as well as much else in corporate law–are inadequate.  E.g., 
Bratton, supra.  Either way, forming such an opinion is difficult without an understanding of 
accounting knowledge relating to the processes of measuring and aggregating data and 
related accounting aspects of internal controls. 
107  SEC Rule 13(b)(2)(B). See also SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 (SEC Staff warning 
that immaterial but intention misstatements may constitute violation of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act). 
108  Numerous professional bodies, mostly drawn from the accounting and auditing 
professions, have expended substantial effort since 1975 refining the concept and 
development of internal controls.  These include, in particular, the National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (the “Treadway Commission”), jointly sponsored by the AICPA, 
the American Accounting Association, the Financial Executives Institute, the Institute of Internal 
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staggering civil and criminal penalties.109  Understanding the most basic features of corporate 
governance, therefore, depends on some grasp of accounting.110 
Students taught that they must advise directors as to the scope of their duty of care 
must have some sense of what that means in concrete rather than abstract terms.  A board 
typically seeks advice from lawyers while making decisions, unlike doctors, say, who work in 
the operating room without their lawyers present.  When the duty of care calls for a director to 
possess a rudimentary understanding of a business and basic accounting principles, the 
lawyer must know what that rudimentary understanding is in a way that a medical malpractice 
lawyer need not know first-hand the relevant standards of care that surgeons owe their 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Auditors, and the National Associate of Accountants (these organizations are in turn 
collectively called the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (“COSO”) of the Treadway 
Commission and operate their own project on internal controls).  Members of the legal 
profession, particularly those in the ABA Business Law Section’s Committee on Law and 
Accounting, play important roles in monitoring the proposals of these organizations.  E.g., 
“Management” Reports on Internal Control: A Legal Perspective, 49 Bus. Law. 889 (1994). 
109  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(4), (5) 
(1994) (criminal liability for persons who knowingly circumvent or fail to implement systems of 
internal controls or knowingly falsify books and records) (as noted above, this statute applies 
to all business transactions, foreign and domestic). 
110  Other cases contained in numerous Corporations casebooks that require some 
accounting sense to appreciate include Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. 





The classic case Francis v. United Jersey Bank makes the point about what directors 
must know.111   A court found a board member liable for breach of her duty of care, owing to 
her failure to read financial statements that would have tipped her off to embezzlement at the 
company.  Francis acknowledges that while board members don’t have to be accountants, 
they must have a sufficient understanding of the subject to read financial statements and to 
spot questions they raise.  A law student can’t be expected to understand the nature of the 
advice required to be given to a director–that the director have a rudimentary understanding of 
accounting–without knowing what the advice calls for–a rudimentary understanding of 
accounting. 
At an even more particular level of case law study requiring accounting sense, consider 
Ash v. McCall.112   Shareholders alleged breach of the duty of care and waste against the 
buyer’s board in an acquisition of a company plagued by accounting irregularities that 
produced enormous overpayment in the purchase price–the McKesson-HBOC deal.  The 
accounting related to revenue recognition rules, chiefly the booking of sales as final that were 
in fact contingent, and made contingent through side letters offering return privileges not part of 
the company’s ordinary sales practices.  Some evidence showed more aggressive accounting 
practices, such as backdating sales contracts.   
Plaintiffs argued that numerous red flags would have alerted a reasonably prudent 
                                                                 
111  432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981). 
112  2000 WL 1370341 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
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buyer to the irregularities.   These consisted entirely of published reports questioning the 
target’s accounts receivable.  Though the judge could have displayed a bit more accounting 
virtuosity by explaining the content of these reports, even getting a class discussion this far into 
the dispute requires a little background on revenue recognition as well as internal controls.  It 
also requires a detour into the nature and extent of accounting and financial due diligence 
conducted in connection with a merger transaction and how easy or difficult it is to discover 
such shenanigans.113 
Another broad topic covered in the basic corporations that cannot be understood 
without the ABCs of accounting under one’s belt concerns dividend policy, and particularly the 
restrictions on shareholder distributions.   We already covered the broad subject when 
considering the professional activities of a business lawyer, so now let’s consider a particular 
case often studied in the basic corporations course, Kamin v. American Express.114  Amex 
held stock in another company with a tax basis of $30 million and a current market price of $4 
million and its board decided to withdraw from the investment.  It considered two alternatives 
to do so. 
Plan A was to distribute the stock as a dividend to stockholders.  That would result in a 
reduction of the asset side of the balance sheet of the carrying value of the stock and a 
reduction to the owners’ equity portion of the balance sheet in like amount (retained earnings). 
 The holders would get $4 million.  Plan B was to sell the stock, take a hit to income of $26 
                                                                 
113  The court dismissed the complaint’s theories of waste and breach of the duty of care. 
114  383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976). 
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million for GAAP and income tax purposes and thus reduce net income by an order of about 
$8 million.  The company would then distribute the $4 million proceeds it would have 
distributed under plan A, plus the $8 million tax savings as a distribution to shareholders.  
The board opted for Plan A though Plan B looks more economically rational.  It did so 
because it judged that the market pays more attention to income than to asset levels and 
wanted to avoid having the market punish its stock price–an understanding students without an 
accounting sense cannot possibly achieve.  Ditto for understanding why the court deferred to 
the board’s judgment in dismissing the plaintiff’s claim. 
Testing the reasonableness of corporate charitable contributions against the doctrine of waste often 
calls for some accounting sense.  Two staples of the corporations course make the point, Theodora 
Holding Corp. v. Henderson115  and Kahn v. Sullivan.116  In Theodora, the court puts into 
perspective a gift of more than $528,000 worth of stock by using a few tax and accounting steps.  At the 
corporation's tax rate of 75%, the cost to the donation’s corporation was really only $132,000 and lower 
yet after special rules applicable to holding companies are given effect.  Divesting itself of this stock also 
enabled the corporation to eliminate a large portion ($130,000) of its reserves for unrealized capital gains on 
its balance sheet, boosting net worth.  These moves would dumbfound a law student with no accounting 
basics. 
The Kahn v. Sullivan opinion keeps the tax and accounting issues more in the background.  On the 
                                                                 
115  257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969). 
116  594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991). 
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basic duty of care and duty of loyalty claims, however, much turns on the board's retention of law and 
accounting firms as a means for discharging those duties by becoming fully informed about the financial 
aspects of a corporate charitable contribution.  (It may be that just such practices are what enabled 
Enron’s directors to claim they discharged their fiduciary duties.) 
Accounting becomes more important in the law school curriculum in more advanced 
business-related courses, such as securities regulation, corporate finance, and mergers & 
acquisitions.117  To give just one example of a case that could arise in these courses, as well 
as in the basic corporations course, consider the meaning of materiality under the federal 
securities laws.  This conceptual centerpiece of our disclosure system frequently calls for 
understanding basic accounting principles.  Take the Supreme Court's opinion in Virginia 
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, a standard corporate and securities law case.118   
At stake was whether disclosure stating that the board's opinion that $42 was a "fair" or 
"high" price for shares was actionable.   In evaluating whether that price was either fair or high, 
the Court makes the following critical observation:  
"Whereas the proxy statement described the $42 price as offering a premium above 
both book value and market price, the evidence indicated that a calculation of the book 
figure based on the appreciated value of the Bank's real estate holdings eliminated any 
such premium." 
Students reading this passage for the first time may be expected to grasp that there is 
                                                                 
117  See supra (footnote summarizing accounting matters in books for advanced courses). 
118  501 U.S. 1083 (1991). 
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a difference between "book value" and "appreciated value."  But a teacher can hardly leave it 
at that.  Doesn't it need to be pointed out that book value is an accounting concept constrained 
by historical cost accounting conventions, and subject to depreciation cost allocation 
exercises; that this figure has certain uses for accounting purposes, but is not a reliable 
indicator of present market or exchange values, for which various adjustments must be made? 
 Sounds simple, even trivial, but the student with no notion of accounting will be stumped.119  
Training lawyers, and especially business lawyers, for practice is a major responsibility the 
legal academy bears.  Lawyers have a professional responsibility to help promote the integrity 
and competence of the bar, a duty most essential in law schools and thus imposed upon law 
professors.120  If business lawyers invariably confront questions of law and accounting in their 
practice, and it is difficult to understand core concepts and key cases in corporate law without 
a firm footing in accounting, it is incumbent upon the legal professorate to assure it provides 
adequate teaching.  It is probably too soon to sound an alarm that the teaching of accounting 
has been irresponsibly neglected in law schools, but the Enron debacle is the perfect 
opportunity for the legal academy to make sure that time never comes by reversing current 
trends.  Meanwhile, lawyers already in practice should heed the professional responsibility 
                                                                 
119  See Lawrence A. Cunningham (ed.), Conversations from the Buffett Symposium, 19 
Cardozo L. Rev. (1997) (comments of Prof. Kitch putting in a kind word for teaching of the 
trivial). 
120  The hortatory Ethical Considerations accompanying canonical competency requirements  
applicable to lawyers include a mandate to aid in the improvement of all phases of legal 
education.  Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1, Ethical Consideration 1-2. 
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warnings as well. 
 IV.  The Fiduciary Duties of Business Lawyers 
Lawyers owe clients a series of duties in discharging professional responsibilities.  
One is competence.  This section addresses whether a business lawyer’s duty of competence 
includes some level of accounting knowledge. The preceding discussion of what business 
lawyers do and what law students must know to grasp corporate law may suggest that they do. 
 The professional literature concerning legal ethics offers a more equivocal answer.  An 
analysis of that literature informed by the context of a business law practice suggests that 
whatever the duty’s precise technical content, a business lawyer’s professional ethics should 
command them to master accounting basics. 
Lawyers are fiduciaries for their clients.121  The principal justification for this designation 
is that clients seek from their lawyers the exercise of "professional judgment."122  That in turn 
                                                                 
121  I develop a trust-based theory of the attorney-client relationship in a series of articles I 
wrote with Lester Brickman concerning various attorney fee structures.  Lester Brickman and 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Game Theory and Nonrefundable Retainers: A Response to 
Professors Croson and Mnookin, 2 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 69 (1997); Lester 
Brickman and Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: A Response to Critics of 
the Absolute Ban, 64 Cincinnati Law Review 11 (1995);  Lester Brickman and Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers Revisited, 72 North Carolina Law Review 1 (1993); 
Lester Brickman and Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: Impermissible 
Under Fiduciary, Statutory and Contract Law, 57 Fordham Law Review 149 (1988). 




requires the client to repose trust and confidence in the lawyer.  In exercising professional 
judgment, the lawyer must advance the client's interests as the client would define them if fully 
informed.  A wellspring of duties flow from the fiduciary obligation, including undivided 
loyalty123 and avoiding conflicts of interest,124 preserving client confidences and secrets,125 
representing a client  zealously,126 safeguarding client property,127 and–of greatest importance 
here–the duties of competence, diligence,128 and candor.129 
Lawyers think of competency in terms of "general technical proficiency."130   Competency means 
ability, in fact, to accomplish objectives with the capacity of an ordinarily able professional in 
such circumstances.   This ordinarily concerns legal knowledge, skill and preparation, in light of 
the legal and factual context of a representation.131  Knowledge relates to identifying, assessing and 
                                                                 
123  Model Rules, Rule 1.7 comment 1. 
124 Model Code, Canon 5; Model Rules, Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10.        
125 Model Code, Canon 4; Model Rules, Rule 1.6.         
126 Model Code, Canon 7; Model Rules, Rules 1.2, 1.3.       
127  Model Code, DR 9-102, 2-110(A)(2), 2-110(A)(3);  Model Rules, Rule 1.15. 
128  Model Code, DR  6-101(A)(3). 
129    Model Rules, Rule 8.4(c)  (candor); Model Code, 21, DR 1-102(A)(4), 7-101(A)(3) 
(candor); Model  Rules, Rules 1.2-1.4 (candor). 
130  Wolfram, at 186. 
131  Model Rules, Rule 1.1 (competent  legal skill, knowledge and preparation); Model Code, 
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dealing with legal problems; skill to advising, negotiating, and planning a course of action; and preparation is 
the thinking through on both lines of professional activity.  
The professional literature and ethics codes speak of legal competence.  On its face, 
therefore, competency in distinctly non-legal areas of accounting would not be required.  Yet 
the intersection of law and accounting is clear, as the practice and classroom examples given 
suggest. So questions of mixed law and fact arise because of that intersection.  The facts or 
factual context of a business law representation include financial realities and the manner of their accounting 
reporting.  Competence encompasses an understanding of that relationship and an analysis of the degree to 
which differences exist that affect legal relations. 
Reinforcing this common-sense view are prudential factors that stem from two kindred 
duties, the duty of diligence132 and the duty of candor.133  The duty of diligence may compel 
business lawyers, as a matter of legal ethics, to gain a little accounting competency.  Advising 
a corporate client concerning the disposition of 60% of its “net book assets” may require 
brushing up on the meaning of the terms assets, sales and earnings.  Failing that, the duty of 
candor probably compels lawyers to inform clients of limited capabilities.  
As an outer limit, finally, and apparently an issue implicated by Enron, lawyers must 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Canon 6, DR  6-101(A)(1)-(A)(2) (competence). 
132  Model Code, DR  6-101(A)(3) (diligence).    
133  Model Rules, Rule 8.4(c)  (candor); Model Code, 21, DR 1-102(A)(4), 7-101(A)(3) 
(candor); Model  Rules, Rules 1.2-1.4 (candor); 
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advise clients so that they avoid any violation of the law134 and may not “counsel or assist a 
client in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent.”135   Lawyers cannot further a client’s criminal or 
fraudulent purpose nor continue representation that is known to assist the client in the design.  
These mandates call for active rather than passive attention to client actions and purposes.136  
They encompass the capacity to address non-legal matters, in the business law setting 
including ways accounting facts may indicate when fraud or criminality is afoot.137  Cynicism is 
obviously not required, but healthy professional skepticism and curiosity is. 
One distinguishing feature of business lawyering is the frequent presence of an 
organizational client, such as a corporation or partnership.  Lawyers’ duties in such 
representations can run in numerous directions, depending on who is identified as the 
client.138  Candidates are the entity itself, plus its board of directors, individual directors, 
                                                                 
134  Model Rules, Rule 1.6 (Comment); Rule 1.2 (Comment, adding “knowingly” as a 
qualification). 
135  Id., Rule 1.6. 
136  Cf. ABA Canon 32 (“The Lawyer’s Duty in the Last Analysis: a lawyer “advances the honor 
of his profession and the best interests of his client when he renders service or gives advice 
tending to impress upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest 
principles of moral law.”). 
137  Cf. Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 151(3) (“In counseling a client, a lawyer 
may address non-legal aspects of a proposed course of conduct, including moral, reputational, 
economic, social, political and business aspects.”). 
138  Model Rules, Rule 1.13 (reflecting this entity theory of the corporation); compare Model 
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committees, individual executives, and all other juridical agents.  A business lawyer urged to 
act on a manager’s behalf when the corporate client’s interest would be harmed must not act.  
Knowing that the managerial and corporate interest diverge in these ways may depend 
critically upon some accounting dexterity.  
If a business lawyer’s duty of competence encompasses matters of accounting, 
however, this by no means requires direct or prior knowledge of accounting.  That is only one 
way to discharge the duty.   Lawyers may also discharge the duty of competence by learning 
on the spot.  Lawyers can also meet their duty of competence by leaning on other lawyers with 
the requisite expertise.139  So the duty of competence can be discharged by knowing, learning, 
or affiliating.  In the case of affiliation, moreover, relying upon trained accountants would 
ordinarily meet the requirements of the duty. 
Even if the duty of competence can be met by associating with accountants possessing 
the core competency, there remains a substantial professional and practical necessity for 
business lawyers to have a working knowledge of relevant accounting standards.   This view of 
the duty of competence means only that failure of business lawyers to understand accounting 
issues involved in transactions they are structuring and advising upon do not, as a technical 
matter, breach their professional responsibility or constitute malpractice. 
But this is not saying much.  In practice, after all, enforcement of competency standards by 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Code, DR 4-101, 5-101, DR 5-105 (eschewing the entity theory of the corporation in favor of 
rules relating to confidentiality and loyalty). 
139  Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics (1986), 185-192. 
 
 56 
professional discipline is rare, limited to the "blatant bungler."140   Legal malpractice claims can be defeated 
even for failure to master legal principles taught in basic first-year law classes, such as the rule against 
perpetuities.141  Failure to master accounting matters, even in the intersection of law and accounting, is less 
likely to result in successful malpractice claims.  For these, a good defense would be the hardy "mere error 
in judgment" doctrine, strong so long as a lawyer can show good faith.142 
But should this excuse business lawyers from the effort?  All lawyers know that just because 
something is legal doesn’t mean it is right.  In the area of legal ethics, just because a duty can be technically 
discharged in a painless way, doesn’t mean client interests are served.  This is particularly the case when 
rival lawyers are masters of the competency.  Clients without such lawyers are twice disadvantaged.  
Rather than examining the technical content of the duty of competence and doing the 
bare minium to meet it, the more ethical and prudential question is how best to meet client 
needs in the realistic context of business law practice.143  The answer is akin to the knowledge 
                                                                 
140  Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics (1986), 190; Stephen Gillers, Regulation of 
Lawyers (4th ed. 1995), 654 (citing Susan Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer 
Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 Geo. L. J. 705 (1981)). 
141  Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961).   
142  Wolfram, supra, 213-214.          
143  Cf. In re Cooperman, 83 N.Y.2d 465, 469 (1994) (Bellacosa, J.) (“The conduct of attorneys 
is not measured by how close to the edge of thin ice they skate. The measure of an attorney's 
conduct is not how much clarity can be squeezed out of the strict letter of the law, but how much 
honor can be poured into the generous spirit of lawyer-client relationships.”). 
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lawyers in other fields must command though no formal legal or ethical demand is imposed on 
the lawyer: environmental lawyers knowing a little geology; medical malpractice lawyers 
knowing a little medicine; constitutional lawyers knowing some political theory; agents who are 
lawyers knowing something about publishing, music, or sports; and criminal defense lawyers 
having some street smarts.  
Business lawyers may also be required to have a core competency in such related 
fields as  antitrust,144 environmental law, intellectual property, regulatory, tax, even zoning.  To 
the extent these arise less frequently than accounting issues, however, it is far easier for 
business lawyers to discharge the duty of competence through affiliation rather than using 
direct knowledge.  For example, suppose an M&A lawyer represents a buyer of a 
manufacturing facility with numerous underground storage tanks.  As part of his due diligence 
in assessing risks of assuming environmental liabilities he may retain a geologist to conduct 
ground water tests and rely on that expert to discharge the duty of competence.   
                                                                 
144  M&A lawyers in particularly must shoulder a duty of competence with respect to knowledge 
of economics when evaluating the potential antitrust implications of proposed transactions and 
how to address them.  The relevant variables for determining whether the Clayton Act, 
Sherman Act, or  the FTC Act pose threats to competition, free trade or fair competition, 
respectively, hinge upon defining markets, measuring concentration, calculating market shares 
using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, and estimating efficiency gains.  E.g., Department of 
Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 
41552-01 (1998) (adopted Sept. 10, 1992).  The lawyer-economist and law/economics mix in 
these settings is conceptually, functionally, and ethically analogous to the lawyer-accounting 
and law/accounting mix addressed in this article generally. 
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Certainly he can do the same thing as to the financial statements furnished about the 
facility–hire an accountant (or have the client hire an accountant).  However, one difference in 
thinking about this context is that the M&A lawyer will face the accounting questions in every 
deal he advises on.145  Environmental and other matters do not routinely arise.  Also, buyers 
and sellers invariably have or retain accountants to work on just about every deal.  Relying on 
accountants hired by the client or the other side is not the same as hiring a geologist to 
investigate an environmental risk. 
Putting a final dose of common sense into this discussion, take a final simple example 
of competency not involving accounting.  Suppose a lease agreement containing a provision 
prohibiting assignment without a landlord’s consent.  Wise lawyers contacting a landlord 
seeking such a consent will not tip their hand about how important that consent is to the deal.  
They instead will as much as ethically possible allow the landlord to believe that the lease can 
simply be left out of the deal.  Indeed, lawyers may even indicate that absent the consent the 
deal can be structured in a manner not requiring it, as switching from an asset acquisition 
structure to a stock deal.146   
Ask two questions about this fact pattern.  First, would a lawyer’s giving away the goose 
                                                                 
145  The same is true of tax.  Large and medium size law firms have responded to tax 
pervasiveness by building up entire tax departments, while smaller and solo operations 
routinely retain tax law experts for support.  The future of law firms may be to include some 
accounting expertise on similar terms, wholly apart from questions concerning the debate over 
multi-disciplinary practice. 
146    E.g., Branmar Theatre Co. v. Branmar, Inc., 264 A.2d 526 (Del. Ch. 1970). 
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be professional malpractice or a violation of principles of professional responsibility?  It would 
certainly come close.  Second, how different is this from the example given earlier of a lawyer 
who knows he needs the consent of a 15% shareholder for a merger that would otherwise not 
be given the desired accounting treatment? 
 
 V. The Competency of Business Lawyers  
A familiar pass-the-buck pas de deus in deal meetings and conference calls occurs when the 
accountant says, after an impasse, “that’s a legal problem” at the same time the lawyer says “that’s an 
accounting problem.” The truth is what’s not said, the dog that didn’t bark: both are right.  Both should be 
more willing to venture into the other’s territory–and the good news is Enron may accelerate what was 
already emerging as a trend in that direction.147 
The collapse of Enron arises from related party transactions that were improperly accounted for and 
inadequately disclosed.  There you starkly see the accounting and law link.  When a transaction is made, 
there is an accounting consequence and in turn or simultaneously a disclosure consequence.  They are 
                                                                 
147  On the law side, see Fiflis, supra; Weiss, supra;  Cunningham, supra; Seligman, supra; 
and note supra (regarding teaching accounting in law schools).  On the business school side, 
see George J. Siedel, Six Forces and the Legal Environment of Business: The Relative Value 
of Business Law Among Business School Core Courses, 37 Am. Bus. L. J. 717 (2000); 
Robert A. Prentice, The Case for Educating Legally-Aware Accountants, 38 Am. Bus. L. J. 
597 (2001).  Accounting textbooks invariably include some legal material. E.g., Donald E. Kieso, 
Jerry J. Weygandt, and Terry D. Warfield, Intermediate Accounting (10th ed. 2001); Robert F. Meigs 
and Walter B. Meigs, Accounting: The Basis for Business Decisions (10th ed. 2000). 
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related.  The captain of the accounting team may be a different person from the captain of the disclosure 
team, but the two go hand in hand, they must harmonize, the one must know what the other is doing and 
understand why. 
Consider, however, a very different professional outlook and culture offered by the 
senior partner at one of Enron’s main outside law firms, Vinson & Elkins.148   In response to 
criticism of his law firm’s role in the debacle, he is quoted in an interview by The New York 
Times as saying: “There is a misunderstanding of what outside counsel’s role is. . . . We would 
have no role in determining whether, or what, accounting treatment was appropriate for a 
client.”149   
If this statement is true, it suggests a wedge between the professional cultures of 
lawyers and accountants that is dangerous.  If true, it may help to explain, in part, the 
accounting transgressions that occurred at Enron.  This is not to argue that had Vinson & 
Elkins’s deal lawyers working on Enron matters understood accounting would have been able 
to hold credible discussions about relevant rules to prevent the accounting shenanigans or 
(much less) Enron’s collapse.  The cautionary tale is more modest, yet still quite meaningful.  
Lawyers with such capabilities will be in a position to do so and, at least some of the time, that 
capability will pay off. 
Nor is this to argue that Vinson & Elkins breached any such duty in its representation of 
                                                                 
148   John Schwartz, Troubling Questions Ahead for Enron’s Law Firm, The New York 
Times 
 (March 12, 2002). 
149   Id. 
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Enron.  As a technical matter, the duty of competence may not call for a law firm’s involvement 
in discussing appropriate accounting treatment.  But the statement attributed to the senior 
partner still defies reality.  The interplay between accounting questions and the overall deal 
environment is such that the accounting issues cannot be ignored.  They are often a central 
part of a deal and negotiations.  It would be astonishing if business lawyers at Vinson & Elkins 
did not seek to understand, discuss, and negotiate the accounting treatment of transactions in 
the ordinary course of events.  The quoted statement sounds more like post hoc advocacy. 
The degree of accounting knowledge required or appropriate will vary with a business lawyer’s 
professional role.  The role and responsibility of inside general counsel concerning internal controls is likely 
to be far greater than that of outside counsel.  The role of outside counsel is likely to be far greater than 
inside general counsel in structuring major transactions.  Yet a different role is played by lawyers 
representing adverse parties, as underwriters, lenders, other investors or buyers/sellers on the other side of a 
business combination.150  
As already noted, lawyers representing the organization have different responsibilities 
than those representing individual officers, directors, shareholders or other constituents.151  In 
                                                                 
150  Lawyers at Kirkland & Ellis are quoted as making this point amid the Enron debacle.  
Kirkland represented some of the partnerships at the heart of Enron’s collapse.  Declining to 
comment on specifics of the firm’s representation, a partner is reported as noting that the 
controversy concerned Enron’s accounting issues while Kirkland & Ellis represented the 
partnerships, not Enron.  Ellen Joan Pollock and Kathryn Kranhold, Law Firm Kirkland & Ellis 
Draws Notice From Investigators Into Enron Partnerships, Wall St. J. (April 2, 2002).  
151  See supra. 
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each case, the lawyer involved in corporate representation must identify the client–whether the corporate 
entity or some other, such as the board, a director, and so on.152 
Requisite accounting knowledge among lawyers may also vary with the stage of a 
business transaction calling for representation.  In the early stages of a deal–and further into 
them for smaller operations–greater facility is likely to be required because the lawyer may be 
the only professional involved in the early planning phases.   There is often no accountant yet 
on the participant’s list.  
Equally, however, accounting is as specialized a field as law, so that a business lawyer 
experienced in acquisitions or public offerings, say, may have a better feel for accounting 
problems and issues in doing those deals than an accountant experienced in tax matters or 
liquidations.  When the expert accountant is present, moreover, the lawyer must be able to 
speak his language—to reach a deal that achieves the many competing objectives of any 
complicated transaction—corporate governance, tax, accounting, securities, regulatory, 
antitrust and so on. 
A business lawyer’s competency as a part-time accountant does not entail that a lawyer 
become a CPA or even hold an undergraduate degree in accounting, nor to read everything 
available about accounting.  Rather, it means a basic familiarity with the landscape—the basic 
financial statements and their relationships to each other, the major categories of accounts 
                                                                 
152  Id. (compare Model Rules and Model Code).  This is particularly the case in situations 
seen in Enron, where a manager’s and the corporation’s interests may diverge, as where 




that appear in these statements, the sources of accounting authority in the professional 
literature, and the range of discretion and judgment accounting rules allow and require (and the 
temptations this creates for massaging the numbers)–pretty much what is provided in a 
traditional law school course introducing law students to accounting.153 
Beyond such a handle on the basics, lawyers should make it a professional habit to 
stay abreast of the top handful of hot topics of debate within the accounting profession and 
also understand the accounting aspects of transactions they are involved with—true sales 
rules, leasing rules, derivatives rules for example.154   This calls for a commitment to develop 
an evolving base of professional experience—the opposite of the attitude reflected in the 
                                                                 
153  Like strides can accrue from perusing a simple introductory book written for the lay person, 
including the following.  Benjamin Graham, The Interpretation of Financial Statements (1937) 
(some technical material is obviously dated but the thrust of the analysis by the father of 
fundamental analysis remains apt); Steven A. Finkler, Finance & Accounting for Nonfinancial 
Managers (1992) (more up-to-date); Leonard A. Bernstein & John J. Wild, Analysis of 
Financial Statements (5th ed. 2000) (more advanced and in-depth but still acceessible). 
154  For lawyers in certain practice areas, such as bankruptcy, the level of requisite accounting knowledge is 
arguably higher than for that of a business lawyer engaged in ordinary transactional work. E.g., American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc. (AICPA), Statement of Position No. 90-7, Financial 
Reporting by Entities in Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code (calling for fresh start accounting 
principles to be applied in preparing disclosure statements analyzing reorganization value of debtors under 
proposed plans); Susan Jensen-Conklin, Financial Reporting By Chapter 11 Debtors: An Introduction To 
Statement Of Position 90-7, 66 Am. Bankr. L.J. 1 (1992). 
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conference-call buck passing.155 
It is not generally necessary to research issues in the accounting literature, but to read 
the leading release or position.  Nor is it necessary, as it is with reading legal materials, to 
master all the accounting jargon—it is sufficient to get to the heart of the document.  Business 
lawyers should get on the mailing list of leading accounting firms that periodically prepare and 
distribute newsletters on current topics of interest.  
When a lawyer’s practice leads to repeat representation in the same type of deal—
M&A or underwriting or high-tech venture capital—prudence calls for learning the special 
accounting issues that arise in those kinds of deals.  The business lawyer should become 
familiar with the interpretations of principles produced by the FASB and AICPA on the relevant 
subjects.  For lawyers routinely drafting transactional documents involving accounting 
concepts, there are a number of reliable practice aids that should be consulted.156  
Tips for business lawyers on how to develop simple core competencies in basic 
accounting thus overlap with tips for staying abreast of relevant court precedents, 
                                                                 
155  How to inculcate such professional values–and whether it is even possible to do so–has 
been a constant concern and debate in legal education.  Wolfram, supra, at 193-94.  In the 
case of promoting a professional culture among business lawyers to see accounting basics as 
part of their bailiwick, the solution is far simpler and beyond debate: the accounting course.   
Cf. Wolfram, at 197 (citing clinical programs as tools to provide skills training otherwise absent 
from the traditional law school curriculum).  
156  Among the best is Terry Loyd, Financial Language in Legal Documents, PLI Accounting 
for Lawyers (1994), 261-322. 
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administrative rule making, legislation, market contexts, and other matter relevant to the 
effective representation of clients.  The list could include more general advice such as 
attending bar meetings and lectures concerning law and accounting, attending panels where 
business lawyers or SEC representatives discuss accounting, subscribing to professional 
literature addressing the subject and so on. 
For firms, it would include teaching accounting basics and instruction concerning how 
they arise in the firm’s practice.  These topics would be part of the firm’s in-house training 
programs, something many firms already do because it is common sense.  When particular 
issues percolate in a firm’s practice areas, special attention should be given to them in training 
seminars.   Hot accounting topics of recent years had the tendency to arise in connection with certain 
practice areas.157   
In M&A, for example, the big bath maneuverer was prevalent.   A sort of financial facelift, this 
strategem lumps major events adversely affecting income to current periods to facilitate improved financial 
appearances in succeeding periods.  It is particularly common in, but by no means limited to, costs related 
to acquisitions, divestitures, reorganizations, and other extraordinary organic business changes.  These 
transactions call for numerous accounting judgments as to both timing and classification.  Managers often 
                                                                 
157  Stretching back through the past decade, major changes in accounting principles business 
lawyers must be aware of include the rules governing the accounting for retiree benefits, 
financial derivatives, business combinations, intangible assets, and stock options.  
Cunningham, Introductory Accounting, ch. 6. 
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expense as much of the potential costs of the transaction at the time it is consummated as possible.158  They 
can go overboard. 
In debt financing, there is the off-balance sheet tricks at the heart of Enron.159  This describes a 
category of practices, some of which are legitimate, to engage in transactions that produce desirable benefits 
without undesirable reporting burdens.  Events or transactions not required by GAAP to appear on a 
balance sheet are among the obvious for both their appeal and their legitimacy.  Investments can be 
structured to be accounted for using the equity rather than the consolidation method, deals can be structured 
to obtain desired lease accounting treatment and, until recently neither derivative financial instruments nor 
commitments to cover retiree benefits needed to be recorded on a balance sheet–and stock options remain 
off-book altogether.160  Knowing the rules and having the credibility to object effectively to violating them is 
a quintessential business lawyer skill. 
Notably (but not limited to) the IPO and secondary equity markets are the proliferation of pro 
forma presentations of accounting data.  Alongside the GAAP figures, particularly for earnings per share, 
are reported different figures calculated by ignoring a variety of expenses.  Examples of such ignored 
expenses are: sales commissions, marketing and personnel costs, and disbursements to start a new 
                                                                 
158 It’s also tempting to give current earnings such a “big bath” in one year to create a brighter 
looking future when the year is so dismal that investors have already written it off. 
159  See William J. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, Tulane L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2002). 
160  Cunningham, Introductory Accounting, Ch. 6. 
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subsidiary.161  The typical argument for excluding these is that they are unusual one-time events, the standard 
required under GAAP to exclude items.  These are controversial methods of presenting financial 
information.  Staying on top of such widely publicized debates by tracking SEC releases is part of what 
most competent lawyers do with respect to staying on top of laws and regulations relevant to their practice. 
 In these deals and in ordinary periodic reporting, the materiality principle requires reporting of items that are 
material and allows non-reporting of items that are not.  Materiality is not an absolute concept but rather 
entails judgments.  A standard legal formulation for public corporations under federal securities laws is 
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that an item would be important to an investor in making an 
investment decision about a security.162    The accounting rule asks whether it would influence a reasonable 
person’s judgment.   
Auditors in the past tended to use a simpler rule of thumb: that amounts not exceeding 5% of 
income were not material and those exceeding 10% were material.  The SEC has rejected this simple 
numerical rule of thumb in favor of a broader “facts and circumstances” test.163  Even so, the legal and 
accounting standards can produce different answers and a lawyer must know both to assure taking the more 
conservative position to assure compliance with both.  Lawyers staying attuned to debate on the question of 
                                                                 
161  Lynn E. Turner, “Accounting Irregularities II: What's an Audit Committee To Do?” (Speech,  Atlanta, 
Georgia February 21, 2001) (available at www.sec.gov). 
162  TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (context of proxy rules, 14a-9); Basic, 
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (context of general disclosure, 10b-5). 
163  SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin (1999). 
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materiality in the legal literature will invariably gravitate towards the accounting literature as well. 
Some accounting rules or topics that command the business lawyer’s understanding arose directly in 
the Enron setting.  These include rules relating to true sales, off-balance-sheet financing, purchase 
accounting, related party transactions, and ultimately, the meaning and implication of the concept of auditor 
independence.  Lawyers are at the forefront of thought, analysis and design of corporate governance 
controls intended to prevent crafty operators from exploiting the cracks.  These include enhanced oversight 
of auditors (current proposals being made regularly); enhancing the power, capability, and role of board 
audit committees; and promoting the effectiveness of third parties such as research analysts and rating 
agencies.  The ultimate way of becoming an accounting-savvy business lawyer is to be part of this 
prophylactic side of law and accounting.  
 Conclusion 
An old M&A story features a client who tells his lawyer that he has just made a deal to 
buy another business and agreed with his counterpart at the seller that he would only ask for 
one representation or warranty in the agreement and asks his lawyer which one he’d take.  The 
only sensible answer is the financial statements.  Yes, we like to have reps concerning 
environmental, pensions, tax, regulatory compliance, contractual compliance and so on, but the 
financials are, as they say, where the money is.  It is the basis for assessing performance and 
value and, to a large (though imperfect) extent, reflects these other things.164 
Beyond the narrow deal-making payoff and ability to understand corporate governance 
that comes from business lawyers possessing accounting knowledge, consider the public 
                                                                 
164   Freund, at 254. 
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value.  Whether accounting is the language of business or of corporate governance, it is a 
central force in the allocation of capital and hence the distribution of wealth.165  Likewise, when 
abused, it has the function of misallocating capital and redistributing wealth to the fraudsters, 
as in the catastrophes ranging from Penn Central, to junk bonds, to Sunbeam, Cendant and 
Enron.  The investing public puts enormous trust in corporate lawyers, whose work usually is 
unchecked by the adversary system and similar constraints and instead must be taken on 
faith.166 
The incidence of accounting machinations increased in the past several decades.  
Formal restatements of financial data reached an annual average of about 150 by the late 
1990s, three times greater than the decade as a whole.  Though this level remains low in the 
overall scheme of things (fewer than 1% of public companies), the trend is unacceptable and 
the number of innocent people hurt in the process is significant.  In this midst, an entire industry 
called forensic accounting has emerged.  Consisting of both lawyers and accountants, these 
sleuths seek to understand the causes of accounting scandals once they are uncovered.   
Their work should help formulate not only remedies in the cases they see–whether epic 
debacles or periodic scandals–but also to formulate strategies to prevent their recurrence and 
thus to reverse the alarming increase in financial reporting  frauds.  
                                                                 
165  Fiflis gives the examples of the tax system’s realization and amortization concepts as 
affecting the questions of distribution and allocation, respectively, Fiflis, supra at 970, but 
equally safe is the point left unadorned in this text. 
166   In re Fields, 45 S.E.C. 262, 266 n.20 (1973).  
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To cheer up those lawyers now fretting about a need to learn the dreary details of 
accounting, a few kind words are in order.  It may not show the glamor and political appeal of 
sexy courses such as constitutional law or corporate finance, but it has deep theory, rich policy, 
and inordinate capaciousness.  It is called hip, after Enron,167 and is lavished with media 
attention, even if that attention is overdrawn just as the media attention lathered on shark 
attacks in the summer of 2001.168 
Appendix A: Accounting Pedagogy in Law Schools 
 
                                                                 
167  E.g., Cassell Bryan-Low, “A Sullied Profession Discovers It’s Hip To Be Calculating,” Wall 
St. J., March 26, 2002. 
168  See Cunningham, Outsmarting.   The number of worldwide shark attacks in 2001 was the second 
lowest in a decade, while during the summer more than 1500 stories dealt with shark attacks, a sum greater 
than the stories from the previous five summers combined. 
